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Abstract; Partai Keadilan Sosial (PKS) and Hizb ut-
Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) are two Islamic political 
movements in Indonesia with controversies and political 
sensations. In terms of organization, the two movements 
have a strong emotional connection historically and 
ideologically. Both are of transnational Islamic based 
movements, although in the end they perform their roles 
in different domains: PKS works at the level of intra-
parliamentary with a formal political party label while HTI 
works in the region of extra-parliamentary and is labeled 
as a non-formal organizational movement.  HTI, which 
rejects democratic system, turns out to enjoy Indonesian 
democracy as "a political blessing." HTI strongly criticizes 
the system of democracy in Indonesia as they genuinely 
support the concept of Caliphate but they in fact are free 
to move, to speak and to campaign because Indonesia 
follows the system of democracy. Although on the 
surface PKS is not as solid as HTI in holding up the idea 
of Islamic state/caliphate, many observers consider that 
PKS still make use of democracy to lead to the formation 
of an Islamic state. The presence of this kind of political 
Islam cannot be separated from the conditions of the 
crisis befalling Muslims, both the crisis of religious 
significance and structural crisis (political and socio-
economic). For this reason, the Islamic movements often 
step forward to offer a variety of national solutions in 
accordance to their respective ideology.   
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Introduction 
In the expression of its adherents, Islam is often 
performed not only as a doctrine but also as an ideology which 
springs from a religious-political view which refers to the 
proposition: inna al-Islam din wa dawla, which means indeed 
Islam is a religion as well as state.1 Although in its development, 
the proposition of Islam as an ideology is still a controversy, in 
fact within certain Muslim societies there are movements or 
thoughts which treat Islam as an ideology. The controversy is 
understandable considering the concept of ideology itself has 
always been a controversial discourse both as a framework of 
thought and movement throughout its history.2  
Almost all Islamic movements in the Muslim world 
have placed ideology in a very important position and function. 
Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, 
Muslim Jama'at in Pakistan, and Islamic movements in 
Indonesia such as Syarikat Islam and Masjumi, were born and 
are inseparable from ideology.3 
																																								 																				
1 Bahtiar Effendi. 2001.Teologi Baru Politik Islam; Pertautan Agama, 
Negara dan Demokrasi,Yogyakarta: Galang Press. p. 29. 
2Ideology as a concept in the Western scheme, as introduced by 
Destutt de Tracy for the first time during the era of France revolution, is 
regarded as an alternative thought of metaphysical presumptions and 
religion. At that time the concept of ideology was considered as a new 
science, namely “science of ideas,” which was useful as “new basis for 
community education”. Natural conception concerning ideology describes 
ideology as system of thought, system of belief, symbolic practices, relating 
to social and political actions. On the contrary, critical conceptual views 
ideology as a principal subject relating to a process of domination legitimacy. 
For further explanation, see Jorge Larain, KonsepIdeologi, ed. Tom Bottomore, 
translated (Jogjakarta:LKPSM,1996) h. 20-21, see also John B Thompson, 
Analisis Ideologi: Kritik Wacana Ideologi-ideologi Dunia, translation 
(Yogyakarta:IRCiSod, 2003). p. 17 
3The construction of Islam as and ideology (Islamic ideology) is 
based on the view of Islam as a universal religion. Islamic ideology is an 
ideology which is derived from life principles based on Islam, that is: “a 
comprehensive ideology as it comprises principles as foundation of belief 
and a starting point for any activities. It is absolute (not relative), with a 
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There are many academic reasons explaining the 
importance of studies on Islamist parties or Islamist 
movements. Among them is upon integrating Islamism and 
democracy. Does Islamism make a potential capability of 
strengthening social reform and democracy in the Muslim 
world or otherwise a threat to the survival of the democratic 
wave in the world?  
The discourse of "Islamism is a threat" is largely an 
"intellectual product" of Western academics. But there are also 
studies of the scholars or politicians from countries of Muslim-
majority, especially those upholding a secular-liberal framework, 
which deliver academic and non-academic works of suspicious 
perspective on Islamism. They usually highlight certain aspects 
of Islamism which they refer to as sectarian and intolerant 
movements. They also emphasize the tendency of violent 
Islamist movements in that they think these movements should 
be banned. Terrorist attacks on the United States, since the 
tragedy of the World Trade Center (WTC) in 2001, further 
strengthens the discourse of Islamism as a threat.   
Many intellectuals write about Islamism with a negative 
tone. Those who write specifically about Indonesia and put 
forward negative arguments or behave in a less sympathetic 
manner are such as Zachary Abuzz, Bilker Singh, and Savanna 
Hume. To these figures, Islamism obviously sends signals of a 
serious threat to the nation's tradition of diversity and plurality. 
Hume, for example, is famous for his statement that describes 
																																								 																																							 																																							 				
manual for ways to achieve aims concretely and completely, and it can direct 
behavior and actions of its followers (Muslim) with clear goals, comprising 
an ultimate goal as the source of all hopes as well as short time goals as 
realization of human life in this world.” See Abdul Qadir Djaelani. 1996. 
Perjuangan Ideology Islam di Indonesia. Jakarta: Pedoman Ilmu Jaya.  p.23 
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the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) is more dangerous than the 
terrorist network of Jamaah Islamiyah.4 
Furthermore, scholars who perceive Islamism as 
essentially being anti-democratic argue that Islamism has in 
itself theocratic viewpoints. Therefore, the Islamists are likely to 
see democracy as a way to achieve the formation of an Islamic 
country, and democracy is not an end in itself.5 
So far, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) has 
impressed many scholars for it is regarded as an Indonesian 
Islamist party which widely encountering the dilemma of 
whether to carry on promoting its initial agenda and rigid 
ideological ideals, or to be more adaptive and realistic in looking 
at the existing political realities. Such complexity happens to 
Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), as in its major scheme it 
explicitly rejects democracy but in reality HTI lives in a 
democratic system in Indonesia. Adaptation efforts and 
founding a pragmatic-realistic standpoint in looking at the 
existing political reality still makes a major focus in discussing 
HTI’s commitment in its political vision.   
 
Islamism: Concept and History Development  
In manifesting the meaning of Islam as a 
comprehensive religion comprising all aspects of life including 
politic, and in projecting Islam directly or primarily within the 
political or state matters, some Islamic movements such as that 
of Hasan al-Banna develop the concept of "Islamiyyah" 
(Islamic). In the contemporary discourse it is known as 
"Islamism". Those who affiliate to Islamiyah are called 
"Islamiyyun", while the followers of Islamism are called 
"Islamists". In contemporary meaning Islamiyah, as introduced 
																																								 																				
4Greg Fealy, “Introduction,” in Burhanuddin Muhtadi, Dilema PKS; 
Suara dan Syari’ah.KPG, Jakarta. 2012. p. xv 
5Ibid, xvi 
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by Western scholars who study Islam as well as the 
phenomenon of Islamic movements and Islamic 
fundamentalism, matches up the concept of "Islamism". 
Islamism is a phenomenon of contemporary Islamic 
movements which perceives Islam as a political ideology and 
brings about the trend of neo-fundamentalism with deep 
concern about shariah (Islamic law).6    
Broadly put, Islamism is defined as a belief that Islam 
has a set of norms or comprehensive and advanced teaching, 
which could serve as guidelines for regulations of social order. 
Therefore Islamists, wherever they are, will always try to change 
the existing socio-political rules with norms or teachings based 
on specific interpretation of the Islamic teaching.  This can be 
achieved through peaceful demonstrations or violence, 
depending on the value system persevered by the Islamist 
actors. There are two main characteristics of Islamism: Islamic 
state and Islamic activism in a diverse spectrum.  The two are 
interconnected and cannot be separated, as establishing an 
Islamic state is not possible without a well organized Islamic 
activism.7 This movement (Islamism) views that Islam cannot 
be separated from and that it has an integral relationship with 
governmental politics, since Islam comprises all aspects of life.8  
This Islamist group tends to be identified as the ideologically 
																																								 																				
6Haedar Nashir, Gerakan Islam Syari’at; Reproduksi Salafiyah Ideologis di 
Indonesia, Jakarta 2007. Although in various occasions liberal groups criticize 
Islamism. To them, Islamism is a movement contradicting modern politics. 
Islamism is in a sense similar with Fasisme which has been an opponent to 
democracy and freedom. For more explanation, see  Arun Kundnani, 
Islamism and the Roots of Liberal Rage, Race Class 2008, Vol. 50(2): 44–45 
7Burhanuddin Muhtadi, Dilema  PKS; Antara Suara dan Syariah 
(Jakarta: Gramedia,2012) pp. 48-49. 
8Olivier Roy,  The Failure of Political Islam, in Haedar Nashir, 
Gerakan Islam Syariah: Reproduksi Salafiyah di Indonesia, Disertasi, 
Universitas Gadjah Mada,2006, p. 275 
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motivated Muslims serving as representations of the "Islamic 
movement" (al-harakah al–Islamiyyah).9       
Islamism can also be interpreted as a movement or 
organization that seeks to change Muslim community with 
programs and ideology fetched from the sacred text of Islam.10  
Unlike the term "Fundamentalist", "militant", "radical" or 
"terrorist", which tend to carry pejorative connotations and may 
contain Western reductionism, the term "Islamist" (Islamiyyun) is 
a name chosen by those who take parts in the Islamists 
movement.  The term "Islamist" is different from the term 
"Muslim" in the sense that the former refers to people with a 
conscious activist agenda, while the second is a nominal identity 
for an individual or a group of people in a series of ideological 
views. Islamism refers to the political Islamists as well as the 
process of re-Islamization.11 
In this context, Salwa Ismail asserts:  
"Political Islamist refers to organizational activity 
and movement which burst into public space by 
means of signs and symbols from Islamic tradition. 
It belongs to a political ideology which articulates 
the idea of the need to establish an Islamic 
government conceived as implementing shari'a 
(Islamic law). Islamization or re-Islamization 
reflects encouragement to Islamize social space. It 
implies a process in which various domains of 
social life are implanted with signs and symbols 
associated with Islamic cultural traditions. 12   
Ayubi brings up that Islamism is a term commonly used 
to refer to three categories of Islamic movements: Salafi, 
																																								 																				
9Dale F. Eickelman dan James Piscatori, Ekspresi Politik Muslim 
(Bandung:Mizan,1998) p. 58 
10Najib Ghadbian, op.cit, p. 6. 
11Masdar Hilmy, Teologi Perlawanan; Islamisme dan Diskursus di 
Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru (Yogyakarta: Kanisius,2009), p.24 
12Ibid, 
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fundamentalist and neo-fundamentalist.  Islamism does not 
merely emphasize on Muslims identity, but it is more a 
conscious choice of Islam as a doctrine and ideology. Political 
Islam is often used to refer to the category of fundamentalist 
and neo-fundamentalists who tend to emphasize the political 
character of Islam and are directly involved in anti-state 
activities. 13   
The indication of Islamic ideologization has become 
more frequently associated with “Islamism” (Islamiyyah), which, 
in the discourse of contemporary Islam, has been increasingly 
used a more appropriate choice of term instead for 
fundamentalism, which gains a lot of criticism for containing 
many downsides and ambiguity. In the era of Islamic revivalism 
at the end of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20 
century, Islamic ideologization seemed to equal Jamaluddin Al-
Afghani’s Pan-Islamism, which in further development has 
echoed to the entire Islamic world including Indonesia.14 
Pan-Islamic movement with a caliphate leadership 
model in the Islamic world has been increasingly become a 
major issue, especially at the beginning of the 20th century 
along with the growth of national consciousness for 
independence in almost all colonized Muslim countries. The 
movement continues to spread after the Ottoman government 
under Sultan Salim I seized Egypt in 1917 and brought about 
the issue of a worldwide Islamic caliphate and pronounced 
himself as protectors of Mecca and Medina. It was after the 
																																								 																				
13Nazih N. Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World 
(Londres, New York:Routledge, 1993). In Masdar Hilmy, Teologi Perlawanan; 
Islamisme dan Diskursus di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru (Yogyakarta: 
Kanisisus,2009), p.25. 
14Pan-Islamism is a movement to unify the entire Muslim world 
into one political and religious union under the leadership of a Khalifah, 
including in assembling solidarity or Islamic ukhuwah for the revival of Islam. 
See Peter R. Demant, Islam vs Islamism (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2006) p. 
80. 
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victory of Sultan Salim that Pan-Islamic issues and movements 
widespread into the whole Islamic world, including Indonesia.    
In the context of Indonesia, since the beginning of its 
arrival Islam has been full of dynamics with its own color. The 
dynamics can be obviously observed when Islam deals with 
politics or the power of state, especially in the modern era after 
contact with the structure of the nation-state since Indonesian 
Independence in 1945 which leads Islam to its full problematic 
ideological struggle.  This made a new phase after a prolonged 
cultural Islamization since the early days of the arrival of Islam 
to the archipelago as well as a pre - modern political contiguity 
in the power dynamics of Islamic countries since the 13th 
century. In such a context, the presence of Islam in real life of 
its adherents and the world at large became a complex and 
colorful historical and sociological fact. Moreover, as a religious 
movement which does not separate religious affairs from those 
of politics, Islamization always raises the process of meeting 
and dialogue between demands of doctrine nature with the 
reality of the social environment.15   
Political defeat suffered by the Muslims took place in 
three periods of history.  First, the political defeat during pre-
independence which reached its peak on the elimination of the 
seven words of the Jakarta Charter. Second, the political defeat 
during the Guided Democracy, the peak was Masjumi 
dissolution in 1960. And third, the political defeat of the New 
Order era, the peak was acceptance of Pancasila as the sole 
foundation of political organizations and mass organizations in 
1985. The defeat of political Islam was then followed by 
																																								 																				
15 Taufik Abdullah, Islam dan Masyarakat: Pantulan Sejarah Indonesia 
(Jakarta: LP3ES, 1987). Dalam Masdar Hilmy, Teologi Perlawanan; Islamisme 
dan Diskursus di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru (Yogyakarta: Kanisius,2009), ;p.26 
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consciousness of the majority of Islamic forces to devise new 
strategies to articulate their interests more precisely.  
Furthermore, the Islamists believe that Islamization will 
take place only through social and political actions. Therefore, 
Islamist movements have to plunge into the political field. The 
Islamists claim that politics starts from the principle that Islam 
is a global system of thought. Islamists are not led by ulama 
(except in Iran), but by secular intellectuals who claim to be 
religious thinkers.  Islamists adopt the classical vision of Islam 
as a universal and comprehensive system. In this respect, Islam 
does not have to be modernized. Rather, the modern life must 
be Islamized to correspond. Islamist movement sees itself as a 
socio-political movement built on the foundation of Islam 
taken more as a political ideology. For this reason it does not 
confront other religions, but modern ideologies such as 
Marxism, capitalism, and liberalism.  
Therefore, we need to realize that Islamism in its sphere 
of influence reaches across the spectrum of various activist 
groups who view their actions as an extension of the concepts 
promoted by the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, 
Hasan al - Banna (1906-1949) and by Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi 
(1903-1978). Islamism has already entered several countries in 
the form of social movements. Although in the end, especially 
after 11 September 2001, the Western view of the Islamic 
Middle East and Indonesia as well as the interaction between 
them turned to be unsympathetic. More than any region in the 
Muslim world, the Middle East is now seen as container of 
jihadism while Indonesian Islam is still considered very tolerant 
and pluralistic. However, the emergence of jihadist paramilitaries 
and terrorist groups in recent years has increased attention to 
radicalization and diminishing of Islam’s moderate characters, 
especially in Indonesia.  
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A general reason commonly proposed by Western 
observers when observing the tendency of extreme minority in 
Indonesia is that the influence of the Islamic Middle East 
continues to grow. The increasing flow of globalization due to 
the penetration of mass communication has contributed to this 
process, in addition to excessive support of Middle East on 
radical social programs. So, the more Indonesian Islam seen as 
reflecting Islamic Middle East quality, the greater the threat 
spectrum posed. This is the issue which then continues to grow 
in order to trigger a persistent suspicion among countries of 
Muslim majority. 
 Islamist movements have flourished for more than half 
a century. Their concepts have certainly grown, and the 
historical situation has changed, while divisions and differences 
have spawned diversity. Nevertheless, all of these groups share 
sociological basis for their conceptual framework.   
The main reason for the contemporary widespread of 
Islamism is not a matter of religion alone, for there are many 
factors that trigger the emergence of Islamism. Some observers 
divide the contributing factors behind the rise of Islamism into 
two: internal and external. Azyumardi Azra, for example, said 
that the root of the rise of Islamism in the past are internal 
factors such as the declining of Muslim political entity and the 
increasing conflict among Muslims, while the cause for the 
contemporary Islamism is an accumulation of the internal and 
external factors.16 Muslims even believe that the setback during 
the pre-modern and colonial era was due to moral degeneration 
as a result of deviation from religious beliefs and practices. In 
other words, Muslims are lagging behind as they have 
																																								 																				
16Azyumardi Azra, “Contemporary Islamic Militant Movemens in 
Indonesia,” Asian Cultural Studies 15, Tokyo: International Christian 
University, 2006, p. 1-10. in Hilmy, Masdar,  Teologi Perlawanan; Islamisme dan 
Diskursus di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru : Yogyakarta: Kanisisus,2009. 
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abandoned Islam pure and authentic Islam. Crises in the 
Muslim community drive the spirit of other groups of Islamic 
societies to make efforts of purification with the purpose of 
returning Muslims to authentic and genuine Islam by way of 
reconciliation and tajdid (revival), such as by referring to the 
portrait of the first Muslim generation (salaf al- salih). For this 
reason, the movement is known as the Salafi movement 
(salafism or salafiyah). Many ways are applied to demonstrate 
this movement, ranging from the peace movement to the 
radical and violent manner. Other Muslims deemed to have 
deviated from the pure Islam become targets of this movement. 
Wahabi movement that gained its momentum in the late 18th 
century in Saudi Arabia and the Padri movement in West 
Sumatra are examples of this movement. According to Azra, 
the two movements are classified as Classical and radical 
Salafism wherein significant internal factors become the main 
aspect driving the emergence of this movement.17  
External factors began to contribute to the rise of 
radical Islamism during the period of colonialism, wherein 
almost all Muslim lands are under the control of foreign 
powers, especially those of the Western countries.  Many 
assume that Western colonialism was responsible for the 
difficult conditions faced by Muslims around the world, in 
terms of exploitation of economic and natural resources in 
colonial territories. As part of their resistance against Western 
colonialism, Muslims performed jihad to expel Western powers 
from their lands. As a result, faith-based extremism thrives in 
Muslim countries. The purpose of jihad for Muslims at the time 
of colonialism was to free their lands from Western 
hegemony.18 
																																								 																				
17Ibid, p. 3. 
18In Masdar Hilmy, Teologi Perlawanan; Islamisme dan Diskursus di 
Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru : Yogyakarta: Kanisisus,2009. p.68 
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 Bitter history of colonialism embedded in each memory 
of the Islamists up to the present will always create reasons to 
blame the West for the Islamic current downturn and 
helplessness in facing globalization. For them, power relations 
have been implanted by the West in the form of economic 
hegemony in the Islamic world. Islamist groups provoke feeling 
of distress among Muslims by creating neo-colonialism and the 
"conspiracy theory" which will destroy the Muslims. In other 
words, the Islamists showed symptoms of inferiority 
corresponding to their inability to overcome the existing crisis. 
In this context, crisis theory can be applied to explain the 
physical aspects of contemporary Islamism. As indicated by 
Deukmejian, "repeated patterns in history is a causal 
relationship between social crisis and the rise of revivalist 
movements as well as religious revolutionalists aimed at 
transforming the existing system into a new one based on the 
ideology they perceive.19 
Today the term Islamism is returning to be widely used 
in Western society with the connotations of politics, violence, 
and even terrorism. With such connotations, it is not surprising 
when it later on also raised debate among researchers and 
students of Islam, both Muslim and non-Muslim, concerning 
the validity and justification of its use. Some American 
academics also reject the notion of Islamism as a kind of 
equivalence to other terms such as 'Islamo-fascism' or 
'fundamentalism'.  An example is Daniel Varisco, a professor of 
Hoffstra University who views that the term cannot be 
accepted for it implies certain bias towards Islam. According 
Varisco, if there is Islamism there should also be Christianism, 
																																								 																				
19R. Hrair Dekmeijan, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab 
World (Syracuse, new York: Syracuse University Press, 1985) h. 25. in Hilmy, 
Masdar,  Teologi Perlawanan; Islamisme dan Diskursus di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru 
: Yogyakarta: Kanisisus,2009. p.69 
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as the later is also not free from engagement with various forms 
of violence in its history. Furthermore, Daniel Varisco criticizes 
the term Political Islam mainly because it is considered closely 
identifies Islam with violence. Islam is perceived as a system of 
beliefs that perpetuate (political) violence among Muslims.20 
Upon such objections some other academics offer other 
qualifications, although not always adequate. James Piscatori, an 
expert of political Islam, carefully defines Islamism as an 
ideology held by Muslims who have committed to political 
actions to implement what they see as Islamic agenda. Don 
Emmerson adds that Islamism is the commitment and the 
contents of the Islamic agenda. Thus, according to the 
pessimistic intellectual stronghold against Islamism, the Islamic 
people see democracy as a way to achieve the formation of an 
Islamic state. Democracy is not an end in itself. Islamists 
accepting democracy is considered a mere practice of "one 
man, one vote, one time", which insinuated their ulterior 
motives to suppress democracy and replace it with a system of 
theocracy if it wins the election.21 
Islamism is actually not a new term in Indonesia, 
although over the last half century it is rarely heard. Apart from 
that, historically put, the emergence of the term 'Islamism' in 
the country can be traced from the time of Sukarno’s debate, 
prompting by his writing entitled "Nationalism, Islamism and 
Marxism". Posts containing such eclectic substance 
undoubtedly prompted a debate between Sukarno, Mohammad 
Natsir, and also Haji Agus Salim. No doubt, Soekarno’s posts 
were related to the subject of politics, and he applied the term 
																																								 																				
20Daniel Varisco, Inventing Islamism: The Violence of Rhetoric, in  
Richard C. Martin and Abbas Barzegar (eds.)., Islamism: Contested Perspectives on 
Political Islam (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010) p. 33-47. 
21Greg Faely, Kata Pengantar, dalam Burhanuddin Muhtadi, Dilema 
PKS; Suara dan Syariah. (Jakarta, PKG, 2012) p. xvi. 
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Islamism with the connotation of Islam as an ideology and 
political praxis to create an Islamic state. 
According to Hefner, Indonesian Islam has long 
enjoyed the reputation as a distinctive and tolerant Islam in 
accordance with democracy, human rights, civil society, 
pluralism, gender equality, and other characters from modern 
civilization.22  Meanwhile, according to Ricklefs, one of the 
main aspects contributing to this positive reputation is that 
Islam entered Indonesia through peaceful means, although it 
cannot be denied that military expansion accompanies the 
process of institutionalization of Islam in Indonesia.23 Dan 
Howell holds that Sufism is undoubtedly plays an important 
role in the entry of this new faith.24 In Indonesia, Islam grows 
as an entity enriching a cultural network and beliefs at the local 
level, changing the local population without resorting to the 
Muslim Middle East. Nevertheless, the above assumption faces 
challenge from Islamist activists, particularly after the 
resignation of Suharto. The fall of Suharto's New Order regime 
led to a Muslim political activity which at a certain point 
experienced a vacuum. The spirit of democracy, followed by 
the withdrawal of the anti-subversive Act and the application of 
Single Principle Rules which determine the Pancasila (the five 
principles) as the only ideology for every social organization, 
and also the release of political prisoners by BJ Habibie, 
provide a foundation which did not exist before for the 
Islamists to carry out activism again. The arrival of variants of 
radical Islamic groups in the forefront took part in this 
																																								 																				
22Masdar Hilmy,  Teologi Perlawanan; Islamisme dan Diskursus di 
Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru: Yogyakarta: Kanisisus,2009. p.69 
23Ibid,. 
24Masdar Hilmy,  Teologi Perlawanan; Islamisme dan Diskursus di 
Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru : Yogyakarta: Kanisisus,2009. p.69. quoted from 
Julian Day Howell, “Sifism and the Indonesian Islamic Revival”, The Journal 
of Asian Studies Vol. 60, No. 3 (Agustus, 2001), 701-29. 
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euphoria. While some groups focus on peaceful campaign for 
the implementation of Islamic law, other groups use violent 
means such as sporadic attacks on entertainment spots and jihad 
by means of suicide. This crisis is used as a base for radical 
Islamic groups to proclaim “genuine” Islam as the single 
solution for the multi-dimensional crisis.  
Nevertheless, the picture of Islamism in Indonesia 
cannot be separated from the general picture of the Muslim 
community. It is necessary to note that being a Muslim does 
not mean the person is tied to an organization's network, but it 
is more to attachment in thought. It should be recognized that 
Islamism is not a separate category of socio-cultural system of 
Indonesian Islam in general. On the contrary, Islamism is a 
melting category which is sporadically by time, and its definition 
could shrink and enlarge depending on the circumstances 
surrounding the Muslim community in general. There is a large 
ideological unity in which radical phenomenon integrate and 
unite in a variety of Muslims segmentations. 
It is therefore not surprising when Indonesian Islam 
becomes a huge spectrum consisting of non-conventional, 
tolerant, moderate, liberal, and even intolerant form of Islam, as 
well as radical Islamic extremists. This large Spectrum does not 
reflect a dividing line between a Muslim group with the other. 
Instead, other group members from any Muslim community 
could share their views in certain cases and preserve different 
opinions in other cases. Likewise, while the brutally violent 
tactics used by some Islamic hardliners are rejected as morally 
wrong, motives evoking the radical forms is perpetually 
growing wider and sometimes gains sympathy, especially among 
Muslims who are considered "moderate."25 
																																								 																				
25Erich Kolig, “Radical Islam, Islamic Fervour, and Political 
Sentiments in Central Java, Indonesia”, European Journal of East Asian Studies 
4, No. 1(2005) p. 57. Dalam Masdar Hilmy, Teologi Perlawanan….p. 69 
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With these characteristics, dividing line between 
peaceful Islamism and radical Islamism cannot be clearly 
defined. In this context, Greg Fealy argues that Islamism 
cannot be placed in separate categories such as that of 
"Moderate" or "liberal".26 In reality, Islamism is a boundless 
unity which makes the boundaries between Islamism and 
"moderate Islam" is blurred. In other words, Islamist thinking 
could easily co-exist with that of "moderate" Muslims in certain 
issues and cast its echo within the mainstream of Islamic 
organizations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama 
(NU). Apart from their reputation as "moderate" organizations, 
some parts of these organizations are sympathetic to Islamist 
agenda. Therefore, sometimes these organizations share 
opinions with the Islamists.27 
In light of method, Islamism in post-New Order era 
took two forms of manifestation; the first form is manifested in 
a structural struggle to gain power through general elections. To 
this point, several political parties of Islamic foundation and 
spirit have been established in Indonesia with the main agenda 
of enforcing Islamic law. Islamists tried to drag symbols, 
concepts and doctrines of religion in order to win the 
contestation of public space discourse.28 
The second form of how Islamism manifests itself is 
through social and cultural activities outside the formal political 
arena. Islamist organizations such as MMI (Majelis Mujahidin 
Indonesia), HTI (Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia), FPI (Forum 
Pembela Islam), the Laskar Jihad, and the like are 
																																								 																				
26Greg Fealy, Islamic radicalism in Indonesia: The Faltering revival,” 
Southeast Asian Affairs 2004 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2004) p. 104-121. 
27Ibid, p. 105 
28Noorhaidi Hasan, Islam Politik di Dunia KOntemporer; Konsep, 
genealogi dan teori, SUKA Press, 2012.p.150. 
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representation of this type of Islamism.29 The fall of the New 
Order regime triggered such organizational character, wherein 
they exploit the weaknesses of the state to gain power. The two 
manifestations of Islamism mentioned above are both 
struggling to create a law-based society.  
Apart from their difference in articulation, the two 
manifestations of Islamism above have similar characteristics. 
The most important point is that they use Islam as a reference 
to the activities they perform, and they call themselves 
"Islamic."  Secondly, they also share the goal to spread Islam at 
all levels through the implementation of Islamic law. Although 
they agreed on the idea of Islamization of state and society, they 
differ from each other regarding the process of Islamization 
method implemented in practical level. Although the 
antagonism between the two sometimes appear on the surface, 
the difference in the method usually understood as minor 
differences in order to struggle for the same goal: the 
application of Islamic law at all levels. The first manifestation of 
Islamism uses intra-parliamentary politics (being a part of the 
system of political parties) as a means of Islamization of state 
and society, while the second manifestation of Islamism uses 
extra-parliamentary politics (outside the formal political party 
system) as a means to struggle for the same purpose.  
 
Islamism in South Sulawesi: the Perspective of Social 
Movement Theory 
In the context of South Sulawesi, Islam became an 
important part in the state government, as Islam is the major 
religion in public life. Up to the present, people of South 
Sulawesi are often associated with Islam. If Aceh is known as 
																																								 																				
29Michael Davis, “Laskar Jihad and the Political Position of 
Conservative Islam in Indonesia,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 24, No. 1 
(April 2002) p. 12-32. 
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the porch of Mecca, the people of South Sulawesi identifies 
their region as the porch of Medina.30 As a region with a 
majority of Muslim population, in addition to the Islamization 
roots existing since the kingdom era, it is very natural that the 
patterns of Islamism has always been there, and even affect the 
local politics. 
Islamism in South Sulawesi itself takes at least two 
patterns: the pattern existing in the state institutions (structural 
power of the state) and the pattern existing outside the state 
institutions. Islamism pattern that exist in the state institutions 
(structural state) comprises: first, the pattern of successful 
Datuk in Islamizing the kings within South Sulawesi; secondly, 
the pattern of Islamic parties which have existed since the Old 
Order until now as Syarikat Islam, Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan (PPP), Partai Keadilaan Sosial (PKS), and Partai 
Bulan Bintang (PBB). While the pattern of Islamism that exist 
outside the formal state institutions are such as, first, the 
pattern of Kahar Muzakkar who had rebellion/resistance to the 
government aimed at establishing the Darul Islam/Tentara 
Islam Indonesia ( DI / TII ); second, the pattern of Komite 
Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam (KPPSI) which partly 
deemed successful by using the structural politics approach; 
third, the pattern of Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia ( HTI ), which is 
consistent with its struggle for caliphate system, as well as other 
Islamic movements carrying the struggle for Islamic purification 
according to their respective view of Islamism.  
In the above patterns of Islamism, there are non-single 
variants of Islamism, as Islamism is very multi-faced that it 
requires a serious study to show these variants. These variants 
																																								 																				
30The term “Serambi Madinah” has been an issue and become a 
new term for people of South Sulawesi.  This to some extent indicates that 
the region has a historical value as a powerful Muslim community area like 
Aceh.  
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are observable in the activism of some distinctive Islamic 
movement in South Sulawesi. In addition, they can also be seen 
in the structural approach (power) to see the government’s 
political policies, in both districts and provinces, relating to 
ideals of political ideology of Islam supporting the 
formalization of Islamic law in governmental institutions in 
South Sulawesi.  
The formalization of sharia and struggle for forming 
Islamic state are not new issues in south Sulawesi society. Kahar 
Muzakkar is a figure considered as performing "jihad" 
reinforced Islamic law as a form of rejection for the elimination 
of the seven words in Jakarta Charter and for the communist 
influence in South Sulawesi in the early 1951. His struggle was 
famous as Darul Islam /Tentara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII) 
movement. Next is the struggle or movement of KPPSI for 
enforcement of Islamic law. For KPPSI, formal enforcement of 
Islamic law should be established through political propaganda 
and jihad accompanied with education and constitutional as well 
as democratic jihad within the framework of the unitary 
Republic of Indonesia. This movement aims to achieve formal 
legitimacy of the institutionalization of Islam in the form of the 
Special Autonomy Islamic Law Enforcement in the province of 
South Sulawesi as a political home, whereas scholars, experts, 
community leaders and leaders of political Islam institutions fill 
the house with rules, manhaj, and laws based on the Qur’an and 
Sunnah, so that the struggle can run simultaneously with a 
synergy 31 
The next most influential movement is Hizb ut-Tahrir 
Indonesia (HTI). For HTI, Khilafah is a solution to the problem 
																																								 																				
31Concluding points resulted from the 2nd Congress of South 
Sulawesi Muslim regarding the historical ground of the Islamic sharia 
enforcement actually consist of 8 points which are included in point “A. 
Historical and Cultural Base” (points 1-4), but the other four (points 5-8) are 
of cultural base.  
Syahrir Karim, Samsu Adabi Mamat 
	
JICSA   Volume 02- Number 02, December 2013 241 
	
of the nation. Muslims all over the country have long lived 
under the patronage of the Caliphate which enforced the laws 
of sharia in all aspects of life and bore propagation to all 
mankind through jihad fi sabilillah that they achieved a variety of 
liberation and victory. It was with the system of khilafah that all 
Muslim affairs were managed to be put together, and this is 
what will unite people, sheltering and protecting them.32 
The presence of the Islamic movement in South 
Sulawesi sociologically occurred in a complex context and 
manifestations, both inherent in the internal dynamics and in 
the external structure of Indonesian society. There are certain 
sociological conditions which provide encouragement as well as 
a fertile ground for the growth of Islamic movements 
attempting to conduct formalistic Islamization in the country 
with legal-formal, doctrinal, and militant characters. The 
presence of ideological Islamic movements as shown by HTI, 
KPPSI, and groups of formalization of Islamic law in South 
Sulawesi certainly raises a question from the public relating to 
the underlying basis of their movement.  
Political expression and political ideology of Islam in 
various variants such as those described above will affect the 
means used by the Islamic political activists, including in South 
Sulawesi. In this case, the most prominent point is whether the 
political ideals of Islam should be pursued through formal 
political instruments by means of political parties, parliament or 
bureaucracy as a venue for political games. Conversely, is there 
no other ways to be taken, for example by involving NGOs or 
socio-religious organizations, to allow the process of the 
political significance’s diversification to occur? If they have to 
use political parties as instruments to articulate the interests of 
																																								 																				
32Muhammad Rahmat Imdadun, Transmisi Gerakan Revivalisme Islam 
Timur Tengah ke Indonesia 1980-2002: Studi atas Gerakan Tarbiyah dan Hizbu 
Tahrir Indonesia, Tesis Master, UI, Jakarta, 2003. p. 76 
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Islam, should it be restricted to political parties which formally 
have Islamic social and "theological" origins, or otherwise 
should they use non-Islamic characteristic parties? 
The fundamental questions above are rising to the 
surface when the phenomenon of Islamism in South Sulawesi 
in post-reformation era is increasingly showing existence. At 
least there are some Islamist groups increasingly showing 
activism, both inside and outside the formal state institutions. 
The issues concerning the enforcement of Islamic sharia fought 
by Islamist groups will be very influential to the top of local 
politics or to its characteristic democratization in South 
Sulawesi. 
In the dynamics of local politics, the most successful 
Islamist party is PKS, which has been fighting through electoral 
democracy and procedural mechanisms. PKS is the largest 
Islamic party in Indonesia. On the general election in 2009, it 
became the only Islamist party which successfully raised 
electoral support amid the declining electoral performance of 
Islamic parties as well as the Nationalist Party as a result of the 
surge for Democrate Party. Such is also the case of Hizb ut-
Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), an Islamist movement with a huge 
typical cadre base in South Sulawesi and with a widespread 
officials reaching as far as small villages. PKS and HTI are two 
Islamist organizations in the area of intra-parliamentary (in the 
parliament) and Extra-Parliamentary (parliament outcomes) 
which are very influential to the local socio-political conditions. 
 In the context of the reformation era, both HTI and 
PKS were benefited enormously from the recent political 
developments in Indonesia because the ideological barriers as 
experienced in the New Order are no longer found. Although 
PKS was born after the New Order, it was formed from Islamic 
organizations previously repressed by the New Order. 
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PKS as a Social Movement 
Furthermore, to obtain a more comprehensive 
understanding of the PKS, at least we have to look back at the 
early days of this unique Islamic party. As with other Islamist 
movements in Indonesia, which were formed in the late 1970s 
and took inspiration from the Middle East, PKS started with 
small discussions among some secular university students and 
later on transformed into a political movement. PKS emerges as 
an Islamic social movement which still preserves its essential 
character by increasing the capacity of its organization and 
resources for mobilization of large-scale demonstrations. 
This section will discuss the historical aspect of the 
emergence of PKS. It will explain three stages of formation of 
the social movement PKS up to the level of formal politics 
institutionalization. The first stage is the phase of campus 
propagation, the second is the formation of the student 
movement, and the third is the political movement. Since the 
basic history of the establishment of PKS was a missionary 
movement, the systematic explanation of the party's strategy in 
bearing the Islamism agendas makes an important subject to 
discuss at this point. Analysis of the mutation of PKS from a 
social movement organization into a political party will be 
further elaborated in the next chapter. Three stages of 
development of the PKS are:  
First, on Campus Missionary. 
 The origin of PKS can be traced through an on campus 
missionary movement. This movement comprised a series of 
activities that appealed to religion performed by and for 
students.  The emergence of this campus missionary itself can 
be interpreted as a reaction to Soeharto’s antagonism and 
repressive actions against the group of "Political Islam" which 
was visible in the first minute after Suharto achieved his power 
peak. Soeharto was reluctant to rehabilitate the largest Islamic 
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political party, Masjumi. Masjumi was banned by Sukarno 
regime in 1960 and has an agenda to establish a state based on 
Islamic ideology. 
 Realizing that the Suharto regime was hostile to the 
idea and struggle of "Political Islam," some former leaders and 
elites of Masjumi pioneered by Muhammad Natsir established 
Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII) in 1967. At the 
beginning this missionary agency focused on serious efforts to 
widespread propaganda in the midst of the penetration 
activities of Christian missionaries.33 In the next development, 
DDI also wanted to respond to what they perceive as a threat 
from Muslim groups of liberal and cultural orientation.34  The 
main objective of "Cultural Islam" is rejecting the agenda of 
"Political Islam.”  The "cultural Islam" group tries to redefine 
religion as well as politics and encourages religious tolerance. 
On the contrary, DDI serves as the most vocal supporters for 
the movement of "political Islam" and it aggressively preaches 
that Islam is not just a religious or theological construction but 
also a political ideology. In August 2000, eight Islamic Parties 
(PPP, PBB, PK, Masyumi, PKU, PNU, PUI, and PSII 1905) 
held an informal discussion and silaturrahim of Islamic parties at 
Al- Azhar Mosque and inquired that the Jakarta Charter to be 
included in the 1945Amendment, but unfortunately this effort 
was not successful 35 
DDII’s religio-political agenda had to face not only the 
faction of "cultural Islam" but also platform of the Suharto 
regime, which never tolerated "Political Islam". The dilemma 
																																								 																				
33Burhanuddin Muhtadi, “The Conspiracy of Jews: The Quest for 
Anti-Semitism in Media Dakwah”, Graduate Journal of Asia pasific Studies, 5:2 
(2007). 
34Martin van Bruinessen, “Geneologies of Islamic Radicalism in 
Post-Soeharto  Indonesia”, Southeast Asia Research, 10,2 (2002), 127. 
35 Zuly Qodir, HTI dan PKS menuai kritik; Perilaku Gerakan 
Islam Politik di Indonesia, JKSG, Yogyakarta, 2013. p. 133. 
Syahrir Karim, Samsu Adabi Mamat 
	
JICSA   Volume 02- Number 02, December 2013 245 
	
then pushed DDII figures to change strategy, preferring the 
path of da'wah revitalization to pave the way for the birth of 
more liquid Islamic social movements on campuses as 
campuses are considered relatively less controlled by the state. 
Campus mosques were chosen as the headquarters of the social 
movements fostered by DDII in secular universities.36 DDII 
figures consciously make students of the secular campuses as 
the target groups to counter the influence of the ideas 
developed by the proponents of "cultural Islam."  
In the early 1980s the campus propaganda began to 
introduce the term usrah (Arabic for "family") and began to 
make arrangements and training for its members with more 
systematic organizations and programs.37  Usrah are small 
groups closely related to each other through a hierarchical 
structure. Most members do not know the members in other 
usrah group. With this kind of organizational structure, on 
campus propagation was rapidly growing and campus mosques 
since then became centers of students’ activities. The 
educational model is well designed and neatly structured, 
referring to the organization and thought framing in the scheme 
of Muslim Brotherhood organization in Egypt.38 
The implementation of usrah (cell system) in the 
program of religious training in campus activities adopts the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood cadre system. Relationship 
between the Muslim Brotherhood and the on campus 
propaganda was also facilitated through student leaders who 
acted as agents of socialization by offering works of 
monumental figures of the Muslim Brotherhood as the main 
																																								 																				
36Yudi latif, “The Rupture of Young Muslim Intelligensia in the 
Modernization Indonesia”, Studia Islamika, Vol 12, No. 3, 2005,391. 
37For a more complete discussion of the training programs, see 
DPP PKS, Manajemen tarbiyah Anggota Pemula, PKS & Syamil Cipta 
Media, Bandung, 2003.Dalam Burhanuddin Muhtadi, Dilema PKS…p.101 
38 Zuly Qodir, HTI dan PKS:…..p.133 
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reference in the study. Thus the process of vision and ideas 
affinity was established by adopting models of activism and 
intellectual movement of the  Brotherhood as –borrowing 
Bubalo and Fealy’s terms- "jewels of propaganda thought."39 
The process of framework transplantation and methods 
of the Brotherhood into the on Campus propaganda groups 
was made possible by an extensive network owned by DDII. 
Since the establishment of DDII, its leaders have directed the 
movement to a Middle East orientation. DDII has already 
established intense and strong relationship with the Muslim 
World League (Rabithah Al-Alam Al-Islami), a global Islamic 
organization funded by the State of Saudi Arabia, wherein 
Muhammad Natsir was appointed as one of the Vice 
Chairmen.40 
 
Second, the Institutionalization of the Student Movement.  
From the point of socio-anthropology, the on campus 
propaganda became more established along with the 
momentum and spirit of Islamic revival emerging within the 
educated society, especially among students at secular 
universities in the 1970s.41 Thus new phenomena of interest in 
learning religion on the sidelines of their studies started growing 
among students. It was then not surprising when campus 
mosques became centers for the on campus missionary 
attended by many students intending to participate in a small 
circle for the study of religion. 
This campus propagation then eventually transformed 
into an official students’ activity unit as Unit Kegiatan 
Mahasiswa (UKM), that is Lembaga Dakwah kampus (LDK). 
																																								 																				
39Bubalo & Fealy, joining the Caravan? 2005, p. 67 
40Bruinessen, Genealogies..., 2002. p. 123. 
41Burhanuddin Muhtadi, Dilema PKS: Suara dan Syariah, KPG, 
Jakarta, 2012. p. 38. 
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LDK is the best strategy for the activist propaganda in order to 
expand network, recruitment and organization. At first, the 
theological thought and activism models of LDK were drawn 
from the ideas of Hasan al-Banna's Ikhwan and al-Mawdudi’s 
Jamiat Islami. The essence of the Ihkwan and Jamiat Islami’s 
thinking rests on the argument that Islam is al-din: a total way of 
life, comprehensive, and summarizes all aspects of life without 
any demarcation between aqidah wa syariah (Islamic theology and 
law), din wa dawlah (religion and state), and din wa dunya (religion 
and worldly matters).42 
In further developments, some LDK activists 
announced the formation of Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim 
Indonesia (KAMMI). The role of KAMMI was then seriously 
considered, especially on the point of Suharto regime’s tumble. 
KAMMI emerged as the most vocal student movement in 
voicing public discontent by demonstrations across the country 
in Indonesia. KAMMI actively run protest to push the agenda 
of reformation.    
The fall of Soeharto, after months of demonstrations 
raised by a number of organizations including KAMMI student 
movement, forced the campus missionary movement to 
redesign strategies to achieve their ideological goals in a more 
democratic political system. 
Third, the Political Movement.  
Soon after Soeharto stepped down on May 21, 1998, 
KAMMI figures started to consider establishing Islamic 
political party. This initiative is also supported by several 
activists who believed that the existing campus missionary 
networks and resources should be transformed into a political 
party. An internal survey on the core cadres of this movement 
																																								 																				
42Muhtadi, Dilema PKS:..., p. 41. 
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indicated that the majority of activists agreed to form a party.43  
The party was then named "Partai Keadilan" (PK), known 
today as Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS). The need for 
declaring an Islamic party by PK was prompted disappointment 
with the existing Islamic parties which were diametrically 
regarded as failing to fight for the fate of the Muslim majority. 
Even more essentially, the existing Islamic parties were 
considered less determined in upholding Islamic teachings as 
the spirit of their political movements. What emerged were only 
pragmatic steps which slowly but surely delineate Islamic values 
from the existing Islamic parties.44 
PKS: Ideological Issues 
In the Vision and Mission of the PKS before it was 
"revised" with the latest version, it was mentioned that the 
general vision of PKS was being a missionary party to uphold 
justice and  welfare in a unity frame of ummah and the nation. 
The specific vision of PKS was to have a good influence 
through political power, participation, and opinions in creating 
Indonesian civil society. This vision directs PKS to be (1) a 
Missionary Party promoting Islam as a solution in the life of the 
nation, (2) the transformative power of the Islamic values and 
teachings in the process of rebuilding people and the nation in 
various aspects, (3) the strength of pioneer and mobilize 
cooperation with different forces advocating similar ideals in 
upholding Islamic values and systems of rahmatan lil alamin, and 
(4) Accelerator for the realization of civil society in Indonesia.  
The mission of PKS consists of seven items, namely (1) 
to disseminate Islamic mission and to recruit cadres as elements 
of change; (2) to develop Islamic social institutions in various 
																																								 																				
43Machmudi, “Islamising Indonesia”, 2006.  In Muhtadi, Dilema 
PKS…p. 103 
44 Djoni Edward: Efek Bola Salju Partai keadilan Sejahtera, 
harakatuna, Bandung, 2006. p.75 
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fields as centers of change and solutions; (3) to establish Islamic 
public opinion and supportive climate for the implementation 
of Islamic decent and comprehensive teachings; (4) to build 
society’s political awareness and to provide defense, services, 
and empowerment of citizenship rights; (5) to teach amar ma’ruf 
nahi munkar consistently and continuously in the frame Islamic 
law and ethics to those currently in power; (6) to be actively 
engaged in communication, friendship, cooperation and ishlah 
with various elements or among Muslims for the establishment 
of Islamic brotherhood and wahdat al-ummah, and with various 
components of the nation to strengthen unity in the realization 
of the reformation agenda; and (7) to participate in providing 
positive contributions in upholding justice and rejecting tyranny 
especially upon Muslim countries undergoing oppression45 
In addition to the issues of Islamist contained in the 
above vision and mission, PKS also routinely campaigned for 
the rhetoric “clean and good governance” as well as anti-
corruption. PKS also tried to preserve its traditional roots by 
maintaining commitment to the agenda and ideals of Islamist 
politics. This situation was reflected in its strong support for the 
legalization of the Anti-Pornography and the National 
Education System rules. Another reflection was the support of 
PKS cadres in parliament or through demonstrations 
demanding the insertion of sharia nuance into regional 
regulations in various provinces, including South Sulawesi. 
These regional regulations take many shapes such as, rules on 
Islamic outfit in government offices, obligation to recite the 
Koran, prohibition of alcohol drinking and gambling, 
prohibition of women to be outdoor at night, prohibiting 
prostitution, and so forth.  
 
HTI in South Sulawesi: Histor i cal  Review  
																																								 																				
45Fficial site of PKS, http://www.pk-sejahtera.org. 
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Hizb ut-Tahrir was founded in 1953 M/1372 H by 
Shaykh Taqi al-Din ibn Ibrahim ibn Mustafa bin Yusuf bin 
Ismail an-Nabhani, an Islamic scholar who achieved a degree of 
absolute mujtahid, a judge (qadi) in the Court of Appeals in al-
Quds, as well as an accomplished politician . He comes from a 
"science family," as his parents were experts of Islamic law 
(faqih). In addition, his great-grandfather, Shaykh Yusuf bin 
Hasan bin Muhammad an-Nabhani as-Syafi'iy, Abu Mahasin, 
was a scholar, poet, and judge in the Khilafah reign. 
After Shaykh an-Nabhani’s death in 1977 M/1396 H, 
his position was signed over to Shaykh Yusuf Abdul Qadeem 
Zallum, one of those assisting his missionary since the founding 
of Hizb. With guidance from God, Shaykh Abdul Qadeem 
Zallum successfully developed Hizb, and thousands of people 
became members and bearers of his thinking, while millions of 
others became supporters. Under this second Amir of Hizb, 
Hizb was able to fight in many Muslim countries (more than 40 
countries) and became the largest party in the world to fight for 
the establishment of Caliphate system. 
In the context of Indonesia, the Islamic organization 
Hizb ut-Tahrir was relatively young (1953) when it aligned with 
Islamic organizations in the country such as Muhammadiyah 
and Al-Ershad (1912), Persatuan Islam (1923), and NU (1926).46 
Moreover, HT entered Indonesia in the decade of the 1980s 
and it did not seek followers from traditional society bases, but 
from educated-urban areas around the campus. In its early 
history, HTI was a part of the three components of Da'wah 
institutions (LDK) competing to win influence at campus 
mosques: Jamaat Tarbiyah, Salafi, and HTI itself.47 
																																								 																				
46 Howard M. Federspiel, Islam and Ideology in the Emerging of 
Indonesia State, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2001. pp. 31-32.  
47 As reported by the General Secretary of KISDI in a mailing 
lists: Indonesia_damai@yahoogroups.com (2Juli 2001).  
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The emergence of HTI in South Sulawesi cannot be 
separated from the role of the network of LDK in the 1990s. 
Makassar, the capital of South Sulawesi province, is a city of 
learning destinations for young people of East Indonesia, as it 
provides a number of leading universities such as: University of 
Hasanuddin (UNHAS), Makassar State University (UNM), 
Alauddin State Islamic University (UIN) Makassar, Indonesian 
Muslim University (UMI), and some others. As is known, the 
campuses provide basis for the Islamic movement to flourish 
through the LDK. In Makassar, UMI and UNM have had LDK 
in the 1990s as a part of Indonesian LDK network, a 
movement initiated by Muslim student activists in West Java. 
However, in the early phase of its development, LDK was a 
sort of loose organization which accommodated students from 
different Islamic organizations. LDK activists of UMI played 
instrumental role in bringing the HTI ideas and developed their 
plantations in Makassar. It was the result of intensive 
interaction between the activists of UMI’s LDK and activists of 
LDK in Java.48  
Furthermore, the launch of HT Makassar was 
conducted with a seminar on Khilafah at UNHAS campus in 
2000. This event took the pattern of the emergence of HTI in 
Jakarta which was held with an International Conference on 
Khilafah on May 2000 at Senayan Stadium. HTI in Makassar 
seminar was attended by about 1,000 people, comprising 
students and various segments of society. Speakers presented 
include: Prof. Dr. H. Abdurrahman Basalamah (Rector UMI), 
Prof. Dr. Mattulada (historian of UNHAS), and Dr. Uthman 
(HTI activist from Surabaya). Since then HTI has been actively 
																																								 																				
48 Syamsu Rizal, Jaringan Hizbu Tahrir Indonesia di Kota 
Makassar Sulawesi Selatan. in Syafii Maarif (ed.)., Perkembangan Paham 
Keagamaan transnasional di Indonesia. Jakarta, Puslitbang Kehidupan 
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run in the community by organizing a series of activities to 
promote its ideas to draw public support.  
As a region of HTI branch, South Sulawesi has 
management levels as follows: HTI management at the 
provincial level is called the Regional Leadership 1 (DPD1), at 
district level is DPD II, and at sub-district level is Leadership 
Council (DPC). DPD I’s structural board consists of Lajnah 
Tsaqafiyyah (Cultural Department), Lajnah Siyasiyyah (Political 
Department), Lajnah Maslahiyyah (Financial Department), Lajnah 
Fa’liyyah (Administration Department), and lajnah I’lamiyyah 
(Information Department.49 
During its development, the HT expansion in a 
number of areas should not be released from the doctrine and 
missionary activities in this organization. HT sees itself as a 
representative of the ummah and tries to construct Muslim 
mentality to restore the glory of Islam in the past. In this 
regard, recruitment strategies are intimately associated with 
HT’s ideology and views on propaganda. Most of HTI’s 
recruitments are conducted on campus. Significant means for 
recruitments are training programs and seminars in various 
forms on campuses. Even so, most of the recruitment 
processes occur through interpersonal relationships between 
HTI activists and prospective members. 
HTI as Social and Political Movements 
It should be explained that although Hizb ut-Tahrir 
(HT) are identifying itself as a political party, it cannot be 
regarded as a political party in the true sense. Sherman and 
Kolker50  mention four aspects that characterize the existence 
of a party: 1) to have alliances and a durable structure consisting 
																																								 																				
49 See Sukma, Hizbu tahrir Daerah Sulawesi Selatan, thesis at the 
faculty of  Social and Political Sciences , Hasanuddin University, 2008. In 
Syansu Rizal, jaringan Hizbu tahrir…p.20  
50 See Arnold K. Sherman & Aliza Kolker, The Social Bases of 
Politics, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1987. pp.212-213,216 
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of a stable relationship among the national leadership, sub-
leadership, and active participants at the local as well as broader 
public levels; 2) to develop procedures to carry out functions 
such as winning a major political governance; 3) to try to win 
the support of community groups and a broad segment of 
voters, to have stable followers, and highly dependent on 
brokerage function and compromise which bind different 
interests and individuals into a working coalition; 4) to articulate 
a set of perspectives which evolve into an ideology   
The above four characteristic can be found in most 
Islamic political parties existing today, but not all of them are 
found in HTI. The main factor distinguishing HTI from other 
political parties is its involvement in highway option. In 
addition, HTI’s ideological conflict with the existing system also 
poses uniqueness in the party itself.  
Broadly put, the presence of HTI as a party can be 
described as follows: First, unlike other existing ordinary 
political parties, the leadership and party structure in HTI is 
closed for public because it can only be accessed by members. 
This restriction is firmly reflected in the fact that the entire 
board of HTI -at the central, regional, and local levels- do not 
have clear management structure. Second, HTI does not 
perform the function of providing prospective leaders or 
society representatives as it refuses to participate in general 
elections. HT also does not form a coalition with any political 
forces, but rather to approach and engage in missionary 
communication in order that the political forces can accept and 
accommodates its ideas in their political programs. However, to 
mobilize support, HTI also conducts campaigns (such as "save 
Indonesia with sharia") and develops national programs (such as 
the religious circle taqarrub ilallah). HT also formulates and 
issues principle statements about issues, attitudes, and policies, 
especially those related to the interests of Islam and Muslims  
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Third, although it was initially dominated by young 
people and students, in current situation HTI’s support base is 
increasingly diverse in terms of age, profession, social, and 
economical backgrounds. Efforts to broaden the support base 
from different business environments are now being conducted 
by HTI. However, these undertakings will be hampered by a 
number of aspects: 1) the Muslimhood pre-condition; 2) the 
identification of several types of business environments which 
are not in accordance with sharia; 3) the long cadre leveling 
which is relatively hard prior to membership; 4) non-populist 
controversial aspects comprised in HTI’s ideology. 
Fourth, HTI members are literally ideological cadres. 
In interacting with other groups, they always preserve their 
normative views insist that their ideas and solutions offered by 
HTI to be accepted as decision points for the variety of existing 
problems. HTI’s firm ideology shows in its slogan: "There is no 
glory without Islam, no Islam without shari'a, and no shari'a 
enforcement without establishment of the Caliphate.”  
From the examination of the existence of HTI as a 
political party above, it appears that HTI will be more 
appropriately seen as a social movement rather than a political 
party.51 The type of social movement applied by HTI can be 
identified by three categories of distinction which Harper 
describes as follows: general movement, specific movement, 
																																								 																				
51 As put forward by Heberle (1951), the most significant 
distinction between a political party and a social movement is that a political 
party only exists in a political system or only in a state, whereas a social 
movement does not have to be restricted within a particular state or society.  
A party is institutionalized inside of political system, whereas a social 
movement serves as a means of non-elite participation  which is 
institutionalized outside the system (extra-institutionalized). In Kurniawan 
Abdullah, Fenomena  Gerakan Politik Islam Ekstra perlementer: Hizbu tahrir 
Indonesia, DIALOG: Jurnal Penelitian  dan Kajian Keagamaan. 3rd ed, 2005.  p. 48 
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radical movement, reform movement, as well as left-wing and 
right-wing movements.52 
HTI belongs to the specific movement as it articulates 
Muslim sentiment to implement Islamic law entirely and 
simultaneously through the establishment of a Khilafah State. 
In terms of purpose, HTI belongs to a revolutionary/radical 
movement as it intends to replace the secular system with the 
system of Islam. In terms of its historical relevance, HTI 
belongs to a right wing movement as it seeks to restore the 
Islamic order which once collapsed and to restore the former 
glory of Islam as the center of world civilization. 
 As a social movement, HTI emphasizes its actions 
with a quite orderly mobilization models. Charles Tilly53 
mentions that the collective action of an opponent group can 
be analyzed on the basis of five main components. First, 
interests: something related to gains and losses earned or 
suffered by a group in interaction with other groups. In this 
case, the interests articulated and advocated by HTI in the 
public arena through media publications and other activities are 
associated with three cases: 1) Acceptance of HTI’s thinking. At 
the lowest level, acceptance of the notion plantation is indicated 
by lack of resistance to HTI main ideas and by interest for 
further involvement. Admission on the high level is indicated 
by appreciation and actualization of the ideology of HTI in 
personal, group, and State level. 2) Active support of HTI 
activities. This support may take forms of participation and 
cooperation in the activities, funding, membership, as well as 
active participation in the efforts of shariah enforcement and 
Caliphate establishment. 3) Policies that benefit Muslims. 
																																								 																				
52 Charle L harper, Exploring Social Change, New Jersey: Prentice 
Perkaral, 1989. p.125-129. 
53 Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, New York: 
Random House, 1978. 
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Policies considered beneficial for Muslims are ranging from 
removal of repression against Muslims, advocacy for oppressed 
Muslims, shari'a enforcement, and change of the state system 
into the system of Khilafah. The first three policies are 
priorities in HTI’s short-term interests. Second, organizations: 
the aspects in the structure of a group which directly affect its 
capacity to act in order to achieve its interests. In terms of 
organization, HTI can be considered to be growing more solid. 
There are some indications of this case: 1) affectivity and 
efficiency of the organization, which is visible in its neat work 
division, centrality of activities or policies, and differentiation of 
organization sections and activity themes; 2) members loyalty, 
which seemed greatly affect the intensity and qualities of 
collective actions and 3) inclusivity of organization in facilitating 
activities of the members by providing spaces in accordance 
with the tendency of each member. Members wishing to 
become thinkers of the ideological movements are directed to 
deal with handbooks and dissemination of thought, while 
members of the general educational background and are less 
familiar with Islamic doctrines are directed to pursue on 
practical missionary activities.    
Third, mobilization: the process in which a group 
changed from a collection of passive individuals into active 
participants in public life. In terms of resource mobilization and 
control over coercive (weaponry, armed forces, or advanced 
technology), utilitarian (of goods, information services, money), 
HTI is still relatively weak.54  HT only has a normative resource 
(in the form of active participating cadre membership) and 
utilitarian (membership fees, one forma secretariat office, and 
publications with a circulation of only tens of thousands to 
hundreds of thousands of rupiahs). Mastery of these resources 
																																								 																				
54 HTI tidak punya tentara, satgas dan lain-lain seperti perkaranya 
dengan ormas-ormas besar Islam yang lain. 
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is relatively very small when compared to other major parties in 
Indonesia. In terms of how mobilization applied, HTI run more 
preparatory mobilization which only concentrate on the 
mobilization of resources to anticipate opportunities and 
threats in the future. The main forms of preparatory 
mobilization conducted by HTI are publishing activity, 
discussions and seminars, tabligh akbar, silaturrahim and dialogue 
with other Muslim groups, as well as meeting with government 
and political figures. 55  But in terms of means of identification, 
HTI can be classified as an organization with a mobilizing 
potential. HTI also has well defined rights of members to speak 
or act on behalf of the group, has a strong control on the areas 
of organization’s activities, members’ activities, and personal 
relationships of the members, and continues to develop 
ownership and control over key resources required. 
Fourth, opportunities and threats: this is associated 
with other groups, including the government, who can easily 
accept new claims so that if the opponents make use of it well 
they will support the realization of their interests. While the 
threats are associated with other groups who filed claims that 
hinder the realization of the interests of opposing groups. In 
terms of opportunities and threats, HTI is currently enjoying a 
relatively wide space of freedom. Democratization is getting 
better and civil liberties have provided wide opportunities for 
HTI to rapidly grow and no longer be an underground 
movement. HTI also much benefited by the more melting 
claims of many secular groups which previously often 
																																								 																				
55The activities of publishing, discussion, seminar, tabligh akbar, 
silaturrahim, dialogue with other Muslim groups, and meeting with 
government as well as political figures are routinely held in South Sulawesi. 
Interview with Dirwan Abdul Djalil, Public Relation HTI Sulselbar, 30 
September 2013. Tabligh akbar at Andi Mattalatta square recently was 
attended by thousands of audience various areas in Sulselbar, ranging from 
children to elderly. 
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discredited radical Islamic groups. In addition, the multi-party 
system that spawned several Islamic political parties also 
participated in fertilizing the growth of HTI. But on the other 
hand, secular groups in the political arena, public apathy 
towards the idea of a Muslim Caliphate, and terrorism 
occurrences which discredited radical Muslim groups appear to 
be potential threats to the movement. With its main goal of 
regime and system replacement, HTI is actually very vulnerable 
toward repressive situation.  
Fifth, collective action: this is conduct of people who 
act together to achieve common interests. According to Tilly, 
political system opponents can be classified four groups: 
zealots, misers, run-of-the mill contender), and opportunists. 
The level of repression from the rulers upon the first group will 
be lower compared to the second group and so forth. HTI is 
classified as a group of zealots.  HT has a very high value on 
some collective policies (enforcement of sharia, Caliphate, and 
the interests of Muslims) and is willing to sacrifice its resources 
to achieve it. HTI also did not regret its involvement in the 
general election, even in the ideology of the movement; HT 
established that repression and violence must be faced with 
patience and firmness of the commitment to struggle through a 
line of thought. On the other hand, in terms of allocation of 
resources to achieve the goal, HTI is classified as opponent 
from the group of misers or, sometimes, of opportunists when 
compared to other radical Islamic groups such as FPI, MMI, 
Laskar Jihad, and others. It is classified to be that of the misers 
as HT does not want to sacrifice its moderate image acquired at 
this point of time to reveal its radical ideological struggle. 
HTI in achieving the vision of struggle sometimes 
considered radical by means of revolution (politics). According 
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to Mustafa Rejai,56 political revolution based on its target can be 
identified according to three types: civil revolution, national 
revolution, and the failing revolution. Meanwhile, according to 
its driving force, revolution can be distinguished into three 
types: revolution from below, a revolution from above, and a 
palace revolution. In the context of HTI, it was obvious that 
HTI is an organization that carries the ideas of revolutionary 
change, or in HTI’s terms:  Taghyir. In terms of the revolution 
targets to be achieved, HTI requires a civil revolution as well as 
national revolutions. Civil revolution intended by HTI is 
opposition towards tyrannical rulers in Muslim countries, 
disclosure of their crimes, changing the behavior of those who 
violate nation’s rights and neglect their affairs or infringe the of 
Islam, and in the end, elimination their power and a 
replacement with a power based on Islamic law. As for the 
national revolution desired by HTI is of unveiling the 
conspiracy of colonialist countries dominating the Islamic 
countries; resistance to all forms of foreign occupation either in 
thought, politics, economics, or military, liberation of ummah 
from all forms of the influence of foreign powers, and 
ultimately, enforcement of Islamic rule in the international 
order. 
Based on the driving forces of its revolutionary 
change, HTI aspires to form a revolution from below. HTI 
believes that the motor alteration is the community, and success 
in bringing about revolutionary change is significantly 
dependent on the community. in this regard, HTI continues to 
build communities to support and take its ideas. HT continues 
to develop a mass movement slowly with hopes of one day it is 
going to explode into a major upheaval leading to political and 
far-reaching social changes.  
																																								 																				
56 Mustafa Rejai, The Comparative Study of Revolutionary Strategy, 
New York: Anchor Press, 1977. p.117 
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Identification of Movement and Pattern of Articulation of 
Interest 
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) 
As a social movement organization, PKS is very 
actively involved in the production of meaning and in the 
process of framing of what is happening on the condition of 
Indonesian Muslims in particular, and on the dominance of the 
West on the world governance at large. An important 
component in PKS’ frame shaping is accusation of Western 
liberalism as the source of problems which lead to moral 
decadence, economic injustice, and political degradation. PKS 
activists specifically declare secularism as the root of Western 
values which destroy the principles Muslim live. Liberalism and 
secularism therefore make the biggest challenge for Muslims 
worldwide in the practice of universal Islamic values.  
In addition to constructing process of Islamic framing 
as a solution for individual transformation and State 
Islamization through formal political participation, PKS also 
offers a solution package through two patterns of 
Islamization.57 First, cultural Islamization of individuals and 
groups through missionary medium and cultural institutions to 
strengthen the cultural and intellectual basis of the ummah. The 
essential argument is that the process of cultural imperialism 
through secularism has destroyed Muslim perspective, so it is 
necessary to have cultural Islamization in order to return to the 
path of reference determined by sources of Islam (al-ruju' ila al-
Qur'an wa al-Hadith). Islam should be taken in universal, total, 
and comprehensive manners encompassing way of life without 
any separation between al-din wa al-Dawla (religion and state). In 
other words, PKS perceives Islam as a complete corpus of rules 
and guidelines which provides guidance for both spiritual and 
																																								 																				
57 MPP PKS, Platform, 2007. p. 48 
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worldly necessities. The conception is coupled with the belief 
that Islam is universal. This universality of Islam is then planted 
as the spiritual and moral basis for the development of 
Indonesia. The cultural Islamization is performed by gradual 
and phased manner, and it takes a long process to accomplish.58 
The second type of PKS’ prognostic framing is a 
structural Islamization approach.59 Some prominent PKS 
figures admit that the primary purpose is the establishment of 
"a State with an Islamic Low based."60  For this target, 
systematic structural strategies are needed to realize the 
formalization of law or Islamic values through the instrument 
of the State. As stated in the PKS paradigm, this structural 
pattern takes the form of formal political participation aimed to 
restructure policies and state institutions in order to implement 
Islamic law (sharia) in the community.61 The main argument is 
that Islam must play a key role in the state, and sharia is an 
inherent part of Indonesian society which should be presented 
formally in the law.62 
For PKS, however, the implementation of Islamic 
values and Islamic law in the State is the final stage of an 
ongoing process of Islamization, ranging from that of 
individuals, families, neighbors, and communities.63 In order to 
sharpen the structural Islamization strategy, PKS is open to 
work with the existing political system. This is the main 
																																								 																				
58 Burhanuddin Muhtadi dalam wawancaranya dengan Aan 
Rohana, Jakarta 4 Oktober 2013  
59 MPP PKS, Platform, 2007. p. 50 
60 Di antaranya adalah wawancara dengan mantan Presiden PKS, 
Tifatul Sembiring, “The PKS dan Shari’a Law”, The Jakarta Post, 
8 Februari 2006. Dalam Burhanuddin Muhtadi, Dilema 
PKS….p.169. 
61 MPP PKS Platform, 2007. p.50 
62 Di antaranya adalah wawancara dengan mantan Presiden PKS, 
Tifatul Sembiring, “The PKS dan Shari’a Law”, The Jakarta Post, 
8 Februari 2006. 
63 MPP PKS, Platform, 2007. p.35 
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distinction of this party from the more radical Islamist 
movements in Indonesia such as Hizb ut-Tahrir which rejects 
democracy since its inception. Rumadi calls PKS "parliamentary 
Islamist" for its willingness to work in the system of procedural 
democracy mechanism. However, PKS did not want to blindly 
carry out the Islamization by ignoring structural plurality of the 
nation. The options for PKS is not an Islamic state 
implementation of sharia nor a secular state which rejects sharia, 
but the state of Indonesia with realization of religious teachings 
and presentation of noble and universal humanity values.64 
In intensifying ideological programs, PKS offers 
motivational framing through a massive and organized program 
called dakwah ila Allah, which means “call to God.”65 Since PKS 
seeks individual and structural changes, the party tries to revive 
the aforementioned missionary concept for different purposes. 
First, the call is also directed to conduct re-islamization of the 
abangan Muslims. Second, PKS introduces a new content in the 
missionary materials which emphasizes interpretation of Islam 
not only as a moral and personal codes, but also as a universal 
life manual package for guidance in living in this world and the 
Hereafter, and which also offers social, political, economic and 
cultural prescriptions as well as provides guidelines in the 
transformation process of confidence of individuals, 
community organizations, and the State.66 
																																								 																				
64 Ibid.,p.50 
65 For PKS, politics is a skill to express tolerant attitudes to 
achieve consensus. Therefore it is necessary to apply the approach of 
purification of political meaning with a universal touch unifying nation with 
the elites in a balanced point to produce a redefinition concerning state and 
politics in a diametrical context and content. See Tamsil Linrung, Politik 
untuk Kemanusiaan; Mainstream Baru Gerakan Politik Indonesia, Tali Foundation, 
2013, in “Introduction,” p. ix 
66 Majelis Pertimbangan Partai (MPP) PKS, Filsafat dasar 
Perjuangan PKS, n.p., n.p., 2007. 
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For that reason, PKS distinguishes the missionary 
phases which include activities and objects into four stages 
called the orbit of propagation (mahawir).67 Each achievement of 
one orbit serves as a prelude to the next stage of propagation. 
Thus, this mihwar da’wah is not understood as separate stages of 
missionary, but rather it is a continuous procedure. For PKS, a 
change from one mihwar to another mihwar at the next level is a 
sort of extension from the stage of devotion and leadership 
process. The first orbit is mihwar tanzhimi, which focuses on the 
consolidation and development of cadres.68 In the essence, the 
change must start from the PKS's ability to build internal 
strength, both the infrastructure and the superstructure of the 
missionary. The second is mihwar sya'bi (society orbit) wherein 
missionary activities began pouring its energy for the benefit of 
general public through the motions of amar ma’ruf nahi munkar 
through the instrument of social organization.69 At this point, 
the growth of Islamic social institutions which have formal or 
informal relationship with PKS known as wajihah, such as 
school, hospital, charitable institutions, and others becomes a 
social institutional factor which facilitates the relationship 
between the party and the community. According to PKS, 
mihwar sya'bi provides many incentives for cadres and the party’s 
social institutional structures. Such as, first, the establishment of 
the NGO propaganda provides an opportunity to interact with 
diverse interests of the community. Second, leaders and cadres 
of the party will be better known by public. Third, there is 
opportunity to attract figures from the outside to join the party. 
Fourth, da'wah institutions emerged as an effective pressure 
group. Fifth, professional management of missionary 
																																								 																				
67 Aminuddin, Bingkai Dakwah, 2008, 1-5; MPP PKS, platform, 
2007. Dalam Burhanuddin Muhtadi, Dilema PKS….p. 163. 
68 MPP PKS, Platform, 2007, 30. 
69 MPP PKS, Platform, 2007, 31. 
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organizations should optimize the role of institutions and 
missionary cadres.70 This missionary phase allows PKS to 
penetrate the society to increase electoral support base. The 
missionary media is no longer centered in mosques as 
performed by the tarbiyah group during the authoritarian 
regime, but it has expanded into a broader realm along with 
changes in the political structure which becomes more 
democratic.   
The third stage is mihwar muasasi (institutionalization 
orbit), wherein PKS cadres starts to appear and enters into 
social and political institutions including parliament, 
bureaucratic, and professional associations.71The primary 
mission of the party cadres while in this phase is to perform 
vertical mobility and penetration into public institutions by way 
of affecting, interpreting, and formulating concepts and values 
of Islam into public policies produced by the political 
institutions. This stage is divided into two sectors: propaganda 
in the parliament and in the bureaucracy. Parliamentary 
progation is the official podium of the state which provides a 
forum for the cadres to carry out constitutional struggle for the 
implementation of Islamic values through legislation (taqnin), 
supervision (hisbah), and public statements (tabligh). The 
bureaucracy propaganda is the executive media to conduct 
efforts to translate, influence, formulate, and implement policies 
with reference to Islamic values.72 The expansion of mihwar 
muasasi was more obvious when in the 2004 election PKS 
managed to increase its vote up to 600 %, from 1.3 % in 1999 
to 7.4 %. Dozens of cadres entered the House of 
																																								 																				
70 Ibid., p. 32 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid., pp. 32-33. 
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Representatives at the national level, not to mention those 
successfully elected at province and district levels.73 
The fourth stage is mihwar daulah (State Orbit), which 
aims to achieve power democratically and to establish Islamic 
law comprehensively.74 This mihwar daulah bears a resemblance 
to direct and total management of the state institutions by PKS. 
If in the institution orbit (mihwar muasasi) the interaction of PKS 
cadres in bureaucracy and parliament sectors is still carried out 
on individual and partial basis, in the State Orbit interaction is 
performed in a totality.75 But the constitution, manifesto, and 
platform of the party do not clearly describe the final stage of 
the missionary. This case is made so to reduce public suspicion 
towards the party’s agenda and ideological ideals to change the 
basis of the Indonesian state.  
Seeing the development of PKS so far, the tendency 
of post-Islamism is evident from the political behavior of the 
party, which is focused more on the agenda of substantiation of 
Islamic values. Moreover, politically and socially PKS has not 
been successfully managed to establish a dominant force, as 
indicated by its failure to reach the target of 20 % votes in the 
2009 election. Having passed three orbits (mihwar tanzhimi, 
sya'bi, and muasasi) makes it possible for the party to not over-
exposing hidden agenda related to public presumption about to 
establishment of an Islamic state. However, the existence of 
mihwar daulah makes it difficult for PKS avoid the impression 
that the party is still keeping political ideals to establish an 
Islamic State. PKS does look more patient and keen in carrying 
																																								 																				
73 Burhanuddin Muhtadi, Dilema PKS…p. 171 
74 Burhanuddin Muhtadi, quoted from Rumadi, “Gerakan 
Islamis Kontemporer di Indonesia”, a paper presented in Diskusi Lesehan 
Kalyanamitra with the theme “Menguatnya Fundamentalisme Agama: 
Ancaman bagi Pemenuhan hak Azasi Perempuan dan Demokrasi di 
Indonesia”, 20 Juli 2010. 
75 Ibid., p.35 
Islamism in South Sulawesi…	
266  JICSA   Volume 02- Number 02, December 2013 
	
out the missionary stages. The four stages above are 
implemented gradually through a bottom-up line. This is called 
"tadarruj" (gradualism), which is a series of preparatory steps 
towards a prognosis package or prescription of solution called 
the Islamization of Indonesia which springs from the 
formalization of sharia into the constitution. The founder of the 
Ikhwanul Muslimin, Hassan al-Banna, states:76 we begin 
(missionary movement) from individual, family, neighborhood 
or local community, and then the wider community. When the 
people themselves have embraced Islam as principle, then it is 
only a matter of time before the Islamic sharia is able to be 
expand (its implementation) to the realm of the State.77 
These four steps above can be divided into two major 
strategies, namely cultural strategy or horizontal mobilization 
(ta'biah al-afaqiyah) and structural strategies or vertical 
mobilization (ta'biyah al-amudiyah). Horizontal mobilization 
summarizes mihwar tazhimi and sya'bi. This is the stage that 
necessitates PKS cadres to do the internalization of propaganda 
and penetration through dissemination of propaganda cadres to 
various levels of society in order to receive manhaj of Islam and 
Islamic policy products. On the other hand the vertical 
mobilization consists of mihwar muasasi and daulah. These two 
orbits necessitate deployment of cadres in executive, legislative, 
and judicative institutions through the mechanism of political 
parties and professional cadres.   
After its National Conference in Bali confirming the 
status of the party as an open party, PKS as an Islamic party 
started to include some non-Muslim representatives in the 
eastern parts of Indonesia. PKS also held its second National 
Conference at Ritz-Carlton attended by inviting some 
																																								 																				
76 Burhanuddin Muhtadi, Dilema PKS….p. 177 
77 Burhanuddin Muhtadi mengutip dari Wickham, Mobilising 
Islam, 2002. In Ibid. 
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ambassadors, including the ambassador of the United States, to 
engage in a dialogue about Islam. As stated in article 5 of the 
association’s creed, the mission of PKS is realization of a just 
and prosperous civil society and which God approves in the 
frame of a Union State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). 
Civil society is a society which is highly civilized and advanced 
on the basis of values, norms, laws, and moral sustained by 
faith, respect plurality, be open and democratic, and worked 
together to safeguard the sovereignty of the State.78  
PKS aims to establish a civil society based on Islam (a 
religious-based civil society), which allows for people of faith to 
present rahmatan lil alamin. PKS proposes the idea of realization 
of Islamic values through ideology transformation from 
personal-objective region into public-objective realm. The 
vision, mission, as well as purpose and function of PKS are as 
follows: 
The party's vision is to be the vanguard party in 
realizing the national ideals of Indonesia as referred to in the 
opening to the constitution of the Republic State of Indonesia 
1945. The mission is to make the party serves as a means of 
realization of just, prosperous, and dignified civil society with 
the blessing of God, in the unity of the Republic of Indonesia. 
The purpose of this party is the fulfillment of the 
political rights, obligations, and responsibilities of each member 
as a citizen in the life of the nation. The function of the party 
are: 1) as a vehicle for work in organizing political education; 2) 
to fight for and defend the political interests of the community, 
the nation and the state; and 3) maintain the integrity of the 
Unitary Republic of Indonesia.79 
In general, the purposes of political parties according 
to Law no. 2 of 2008 are as follows: 
																																								 																				
78 AD-ART PKS (Perubahan, 2013), p. 6 
79 AD-ART PKS (Perubahan, 2013), p. 6 
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1. To embody the national ideals of Indonesia as referred 
to in the Opening to the Constitution of the Republic 
of Indonesia Year 1945. 
2. To preserve and maintain the integrity of the Unitary 
Republic of Indonesia.  
3. To develop democracy based on Pancasila by upholding 
the sovereignty of the nation in the Republic of 
Indonesia.  
4. To establish welfare for the entire people of Indonesia 
5. To increase political participation of the members and 
the public in the course of the political activities and 
government.   
6. Fight for the ideals of political parties in the society, 
nation and the state.  
7. To build ethics and political culture in the life of society, 
nation, and the state.80 
In the case of the 2013 election for the mayor of 
Makassar city recently, the main programs proposed by the pair 
of candidates from PKS are as follows: 
1. Quick Response 
2. One-stop service 
3. Transparency of Information 
4. Mayor listens 
5. Makassar Cyber Net 
6. Optimizing Government officials 
Of the seven main programs above clearly illustrates 
that the PKS couple in Makassar municipal elections fairly 
provide an overview of concepts related to good governance. 
Although substantially in reality, such an Islamic party concept 
is not significantly different from those proposed by the 
‘nationalist-secular’ parties. This phenomenon has a direct 
effect in terms of PKS votes in the general election.   
																																								 																				
80 UU Partai Politik No. 2/2008 
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Therefore, in the case of South Sulawesi, there are 
some interesting points to be explored relating to public 
response to the political parties, especially the Islamic parties. 
Observing the situation can rise a question concerning why 
Muslim voters tend to vote for the nationalist party rather than 
Islamic parties. There are at least three answers to this concern: 
First, the nationalist parties are successful to shift the paradigm 
of positioning from the parties of originally branded less 
friendly to the agendas of Muslim religious-political to become 
more accepting of people's aspirations. This point is reflected in 
such case as support of Golkar and Democratic parties on 
National Education and the Anti-Pornography propositions, 
which becomes "an electoral political investment" of the 
nationalist parties in winning voters sympathy.  
Second, in addition to playing on symbolic religious 
issues, Islamic parties, including PKS, needs to prepare electoral 
strategies to win the sympathy of the increasingly rationalistic 
Muslim voters. The majority of Muslim voters are now more 
interested in non-religious issues, especially those of economics, 
rather than religious issues. In contrast, Islamic parties are 
considered less concerned about economic issues and are too 
busy arguing over symbolic issues.  
In the end, if the Islamic parties, including PKS, want 
to win and be trusted by the society, they need to explore and 
offer more measurable welfare programs, and no longer rely 
solely on rhetoric reinforcing religious sentiment. This makes 
an important subject since Islamic parties, including PKS, have 
been mistakenly pictured as failing to carry out programs for 
the benefit of the society.  
 Hizbu Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) 
Tony Fitzpatrick illustrates that the political life now 
refers to two opposing but mutually reinforcing processes, the 
process directing to the center (centripetal process) and the 
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process directing to the edge (centrifugal process). In the 
context of the opposition, Fitzpatrick sees the first process as 
leading opposition to the government's power in relation to the 
demands and interests of the people. The second process is a 
novel of political opposition which is more characterized by the 
tendency of individuals to mobilize around a single issue rather 
than by merging themselves or participating in political parties. 
According to Fitzpatrick, parliamentary opposition interprets 
politics as a struggle to control the board members. Meanwhile, 
extra-political movements interpret politics as an aesthetic, a 
counter culture. The first still apply the terms state crisis and 
state bankruptcy, whereas the second is much more reinforcing 
different views from the left and right spectrums.81 
HTI is regarded as an extra-parliamentary movement 
as its political activities lead to the community (centrifugal 
process), revolving around a single issue and interpreting 
politics as a counter culture, as in Tony Fitzpatrick’s description 
of the extra-parliamentary opposition above.  This is evident 
from the outpouring of HTI concentration on community 
development rather than engagement in general election, the 
mobilization around a single issue such as the obligation of 
Muslims to establish a Khilafah State, and the interpretation of 
politics as of noble and obligatory activities, opposing the 
notion contemporary Muslims who view politics as dirty and 
therefore should be avoided.   
Regarding HT’s political activities, one should first 
listen to the statement of Philo C. Wasburn,82 who sorts 
political activities into two types: routine and non-routine. 
																																								 																				
81 See Tony Fitzpatrick, “Seeming Contradiction: Parliamentary and 
Extra-parliamentary Politics of Opposition,” http://www.psa.ac.uk/cps/1995. 
dalam Fenomena  Gerakan Politik Islam Ekstra perlementer: Hizbu tahrir Indonesia, 
DIALOG: Jurnal Penelitian  dan Kajian Keagamaan. 3rd ed, 2005. p. 39 
82 Philo C. Wasburn, Political Sociology: Approaches, Concepts and 
Hypotheses. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1982. p.125  
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Political activities in a social system express confidence in the 
power structure legitimacy and authority within the existing 
social system. On the other hand, the non-routine political 
activities express belief that there is something wrong in the 
existing political structure and socio-economic conditions, and 
or in the policy, and or within the officials themselves as well as 
in their behavior. These activities aim to make changes by 
undervaluing the significance of political activity routines as 
they do not bring many changes in the political and socio-
economic significance. This is sometimes regarded as an 
expression of social protest, but many times it is also regarded 
as criminality or rebellion, depending on the shape of the given 
public reactions.  
HTI’s political activities can be categorized as non-
routine political activities because it is expressing not only 
disappointment but also opposition to the system as well as 
desire to replace it. HT dose not only down value the 
significance of participating in routine political activities but 
also makes efforts to delegitimation of the systems, policies, 
and government. Such collective actions are very vulnerable as 
they can be easily regarded as criminality or rebellion. However, 
the ability of HTI to deliver a political message without leaving 
much fundamentalist impression keeps the community and the 
state from responding with sharp reaction to confront the 
position of this group.  
In terms of political activity and thought to 
disseminate its ideas and attitudes, HTI implement political 
actions and struggles as its method of movement. These actions 
may take forms in demonstration, sending delegations to 
various embassies, and hearings to certain state agencies. The 
demonstrations are usually held simultaneously in various cities 
in Indonesia.  
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Furthermore, in addition to publishing and political 
actions, HTI also hold a variety of discussions, studies, and 
meetings into the main concentrations of its members. The 
purposes of these activities are to foster community in general 
as well to attract prospective members. These activities can be 
divided into two patterns: 1) activities organized by a committee 
and are the organization's programs, which are centrally 
coordinated and involved in the mobilization of all members; 2) 
activities initiated by the members and only involve voluntary 
participation.  
HTI’s first main media used to disseminate ideas and 
movements is the Friday Bulletin al-Islam. This bulletin was first 
published 1994 and has been distributed every Friday in the 
major cities and municipalities in Indonesia. Besides distributed 
in print, the whole issue of this bulletin is also accessible on the 
website www.al-islam.or.id. The second major media in HTI’s 
movement is a monthly magazine Al-Wa'ie: "Political and 
Missionary media to Build Awareness of Ummah", published 
since September 2000.83 The third media is publishing 
handbooks. There are 23 books published as members’ 
handbooks which should be studied. Three books which must 
be completed prior to membership are Nizam al-Islam (the rules 
of life in Islam); Mafaheem Hizb al-Tahrir (the basic reasoning of 
the Hizb Tahrir), Al-Takattul al-Hizbi (formation of political 
parties).84 These handbooks serve as reference of themes and 
arguments in a variety of written views, statements, and 
attitudes of HTI.  
HTI also spread its ideas and attitudes through 
booklets (brochures), leaflets (flyers), and press releases. The 
																																								 																				
83 Kurniawan Abdullah,  “Fenomena  Gerakan Politik Islam 
Ekstra perlementer: Hizbu Tahrir Indonesia,” in DIALOG: Jurnal Penelitian  
dan Kajian Keagamaan. 3rd ed, 2005. p. 39 
84 See www.al-islam.or.id  and www.hizbu-tahrir.or.id 
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booklets contain HTI’s main idea packed in a book and 
distributed for free to public and members. The leaflets contain 
HTI’s official attitudes in responding to various issues related 
to Islam and the Muslims in the national and international 
arenas. The press releases contain HTI’s statements on various 
cases both of national and international events, especially 
relating to Islam and the Muslims.  
In addition to utilizing print media, HTI also use 
electronic media in disseminating movements. The website al-
islam.or.id. is HTI’s site, which has been operating since 2000. 
The main function of this site is featuring the writings in the 
bulletin al-Islam and various leaflets issued by the Indonesian 
HT, HT in other regions, and HT center. In addition, the site 
also displays current news related to Islam and the Muslims. In 
March 2004, HTI launched a second website, Hizb-tahrir.or.id. 
The second site appears to be managed more seriously and 
includes several major rubrics in addition to featuring the 
writings from the bulletin Al-Islam and the magazine Al-Wa'ie.  
Other sorts of activities supporting the 
transformation efforts of HT’ thought are such as the activities 
in the intellectual environment in forms of seminars, and 
general public activities which usually take forms in Tabligh 
Akbar, book review, or other fluid and open activities. In 
general, HTI activities can be divided as follows: the interactive 
dialogue on the radio, public discussions, regular assessments, 
training, forums of silaturrahim, proselytizing tour, and Tabligh 
Akbar. In most of these activities, there is a separation between 
men and women.  
Public discussions are HTI’s most widely held 
activities. The names and forms the forums are varied: 
conferences, seminars, interactive dialogue, discussion series, 
Muslim chat, book/magazine review, and others. HTI held 
regular review is intended for further introducing its ideas to 
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those who are already interested in this organization. The 
themes covered are usually already focused on the core ideas of 
HTI, for example "Change Method to Establishing Islamic 
Society.”  
Tablig Akbar is more often applied as a political 
machine implemented to mobilize mass supports for HTI. 
Participants who attend usually numbered in hundreds to 
thousands, and therefore, the locations used are such as open 
fields, Sports buildings, or courts of mosques. The theme is 
usually the main idea of HTI, particularly related to the 
importance of an Islamic state and Muslim unity. The Tablig 
Akbar also sometimes makes use of public figures as an 
appealing way to attract larger masses     
The presence of this sort of political Islam cannot be 
separated from the conditions of crisis befalling Muslims, both 
the crisis of religious significance and of structural crisis 
(political and socio-economic). The crisis of religious 
significance among Muslims is prompted by the encounter of 
Islam with modernity. The crisis has lasted since the 18th 
century as a result of demolition carried out by the West 
through science and technology developments. Superior and 
Modern Western civilization has dragged Islam into an unequal 
battle wherein Muslims are weak not only in terms of 
civilization but also in the aspect of politics and military.85  As a 
result, Muslims are also experiencing a structural crisis leading 
to acceptance of the nation-state institutions in most of the 
Muslim regions.  
The acceptance of the nation state occurred when a 
group of Western-educated elites who appeared to be more 
																																								 																				
85 See Tibi, Islam, 1, 21-22, 54; Howard M. Federsipiel, Islam and 
Ideology in the Emerging of Indonesian State (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2001), p. 18; 
Ahmad S. Mousalli, The Islamic Quest for Democracy, Pluralism, and Human Rights 
(Florida: University Press of Florida, 2001), pp. 41-43. 
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skillful in directing anti-colonial struggles assured that secular 
ideologies of socialism and nationalism were more promising. 
This situation forced the ideologies of Islamic revivalism to step 
aside.86  In addition, the reception was also a result of 
negotiations under conditions in which Muslims were forced to 
postpone their larger national interests.87 After the defeat of 
secular regimes in the Arab world on the "Six Day War" in 
1967, followed later by the Iranian revolution in 1979, the trend 
in the Muslim world was re-colored by the appeal of Islamic 
solution (hall al-Islami). This appeal was a response to the failure 
of the nation-state in handing out welfare which was promised 
during its setting period. In the appeal, it was affirmed the 
entire Muslims - 1,3 billion people living within 55 nation states 
– is a unity and to live under an Islamic political order.88      
The appeal of the Islamic order became more pervasive 
when Muslim countries were in crisis. These circumstances 
result in easy penetrate into Muslims’ thinking because, as 
stated by Bassam Tibi, secularization in the Muslim world was 
only to the extent of functional differentiation of the existing 
social system and the redefinition of religious teachings to fit 
with changes, so there has not been any fundamental 
theological reform. In a situation wherein secular ideologies are 
taken as imported solutions of this, the articulation of political 
will on the basis of religion is increasingly gaining sympathy. 
World de-westernization ideas contained in the appeal also 
present a continuous threat of crisis to the legitimacy of secular 
ideologies.  Furthermore, in the fight for its ideals, Hizb ut-
																																								 																				
86 Tibi, Islam.., p. 55 
87 See Fiedersipel, Islam and Ideology, p. 52, 73-74; Bahtiar Effendy, 
“Islam sebagai Kekuatan Ideologi Politik” in Islam dan Partaisipasi Demokrasi, 
kompilasi materi diskusi seri III (Wisata Internasional Hotel Jakarta: Ikatan 
Remaja Muhammadiyah, 24 Mei 2000), p. 62. 
88 Tibi, Islam…., p. 54. 
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Tahrir has three stages of propaganda and political activities, 
which later became major movements in the struggle:  
Phase of tatsqif (coaching and cadre), is a stage of 
movement formation, in which seeds of movement are found 
and the first halqah is formed upon understanding the concepts 
and methods of propagation of the Hizb. The first halqah then 
individually make contact with community members to offer 
the missionary concepts and methods the Hizb.  
Anyone who accepts HTI’s fikrah (Ideology) is directly 
invited to continuously follow guidance in HTI’s halqah, until 
they blend with the ideas of Islam and its laws. The intention is 
to provide them with Islamic personality, mindset, and outlook, 
so that in making each decision they refer to the benchmark of 
Islam, namely halal and haram.  
HT is characterized with an Islamic soul pattern, so its 
tendency is to always follow Islam wherever it exists, and to 
determine its steps on the basis of Islam. They are pleased with 
everything that God and His Apostle approve, they hate 
anything that causes the wrath of Allah and His messenger, and 
they will moved into the center to carry out missionary upon 
people after they fused with Islam.  
Phase of tafa'ul (interact), is the stage to interact with the 
public, so that people also assume the obligation to implement 
Islam and take it as a major issue in their life. This is the way to 
raise awareness and to shape public opinion on the ideas and 
laws of Islam, in order that that they take the ideas and laws as 
their thoughts and their stand in the midst of life, and they will 
walk side by side with HT in their efforts to practice Islam in all 
aspects of life, to appoint a Caliph to sustain Islamic life and to 
carry out the message of Islam all over the world.  
At this stage, Hizb ut-Tahrir turns to convey missionary 
to general public collectively. Activities performed at this stage 
are such as the following: 
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1. Tsqafah Murakkazah (intensive) coaching through Hizb’s 
halqahs for its followers in order to establish the framework 
and to multiply followers of the movement as well as to 
realize Islamic individuality, who are able to bear the task of 
preaching and are ready to navigate the ocean of trial with 
the upheaval of thought.  
2. Jamaiyyah Tsaqafah, coaching for people by conveying the 
ideas and laws of Islam openly the general public. This 
activity can be performed through religious circles in 
mosques and in other public meeting places. It can also be 
conducted through the mass media, books, or leaflets.  
3. Shiraul Fikri (upheaval of thought) to oppose the ideology, 
rules, and ideas of the kufr, in addition to opposing faulty 
aqeedah, misguided ideas, and ambiguous understanding. This 
activity is conducted by way of explaining falsehood and the 
fallacy of such ideas from the point of Islam in order to 
purify and save the society from such misguided ideas and 
from their negative effects. 
4. Kifaahus Siyasi (political struggle) which covers activities: 
a. Struggle against all forms of colonialism and reveal their 
design strategies. 
b. Resistance against the rulers in the Arab countries and 
other Islamic countries, unveil their crime plan, and throw 
criticism as well as advice upon them.  
5. Setting benefits for the ummah, that is by providing service 
and management for all the affairs of the ummah.89 
The phase of Istilamu al-Hukmi (acceptance of power), 
that is to implement Islam in concrete, easy, and thorough 
manners as well as to spread the message of Islam throughout 
																																								 																				
89  Taqiy al-nabhani, Mengenal Hizbut Tahrir: Partai Politik Islam 
Ideologis, translated by Abu Afif and Nurkhalish, (Depok: Pustaka Thariqul 
Izzah, 1992), pp. 43-47. 
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the world. The Prophet’s missionary method shows that to 
establish Islam thoroughly, there must be an absolute force to 
carry it out. That is the power of government. Therefore, one 
of the Prophet’s stages of missionary is receiving power (istilam 
al-hukm). In every season of pilgrimage a lot of people came to 
Makkah from Madinah. Among these are 75 leaders of the 
tribes in Medina who had embraced Islam. In Mecca they gave 
words with the Aqabah II for allegiance to the Prophet. Before 
allegiance was held, the Prophet Muhammad conveyed to them: 
"I ask your pledge to defend me as if defending your own wives 
and children." This event reflected a process of power 
acceptance by the Prophet from the power of the Medina 
community represented by their leaders.   
At this stage of the Hizb-use way Thalabun nusrah (ask 
for help) from people who have the power or influence. This 
was done for two purposes: 
1. Himayah purpose is intended to seek defense of HT 
and its members so that they can keep carrying out missionary 
safely. 
2. As intermediaries to gain power by establishing 
Khilafah and deploying an Islamic legal system.90  
The missionary method adopted by HT in calling to 
the true path is the method of the Prophet which is derived 
from Siroh Nabawi. However, many parties views that the 
missionary  method implemented by Hizb ut-Tahrir is still very 
inflexible and therefore needs some adjustments to fit with 
current realities so that people are more willingly accepting 
Islam itself.  
 In general, as already explained above, the political 
stages / steps of both PKS and HTI in achieving their ideals are 
summarized in the table below: 
																																								 																				
90  Ibid., p. 79 
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1. Mihwar Tanzhimi 
(coaching cadre)  
2. Mihwar Sya’bi (society 
orbit) 
3. Mihwar Muasasi 
(Institutional orbit) 
4. Mihwar Daulah (state 
orbit) 
1. Stage of Tatsqif (coaching) 
2. Stage of Tafa’ul 
(Interaction) 
3. Stage of Istilamul Hukmi 
(power take over) 
Islamic State  Islamic State 
  From the above scheme it is clearly illustrates that the 
two Islamic movements, in spite of their different political 
regions, share the same ultimate goal namely Islamic state / 
caliphate. They also believe that politics is a mechanism to be 
used to reach the safety of human life in this world and in the 
hereafter. Politics encourages people to work together to meet 
their basic needs and defend themselves, both against threats 
coming from outside and the hostilities occurring within the 
community itself. PKS and HTI also play in it in terms of 
regulating the human race in order to achieve a prosperous 
society in accordance with the methods and ideology of their 
own.  
From the author’s view, the struggle for sharia 
enforcement performed by both PKS and HTI cannot be taken 
as an indicating that they impede democracy.  Indeed according 
to the author the struggle for sharia enforcement substantially 
intensifies the run of democracy.    Sharia has become people's 
choice of solution for the crisis encountering. Democratic 
transition at the beginning of the 2000s was characterized by 
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various issues. The most prominent is the inability of the state 
to ensure security, public order, and the rule of law. On the one 
hand, the state security apparatus undergo delegitimation and 
disability due to history loads from the New Order as well as 
the internal institutional reform demands of the police force 
and the military. On the other, social groups enjoy the euphoria 
of freedom of expression, association, and thinking. Space of 
freedom becomes an arena of expression for various groups 
with respective standard of morality. As a result, conflicts and 
social tensions often occur and sometimes lead to mass 
anarchism.  
In the midst of these conditions, sharia becomes an 
alternative, especially in Muslim-majority areas such as Cianjur, 
Bulukumba, Madura, Padang, and in some other districts/cities 
in South Sulawesi. This alternation is not in substitution of 
formal-legalistic sense, but rather a discursive construction as 
the new reference standard of morality and social order. It is 
phrased discursive construction because the real sharia 
movement is partial and superficial, and it is partial as it tends 
to be quite restricted within the area of religious rituals, such as 
congregational prayer, reciting the Qur'an, and Islamic clothing. 
Problems related to poverty, education, corruption, tolerance, 
and social integration has not been touched, not to mention 
issues concerning man's relationship with nature and 
environment.  
Therefore, sharia movement is still considered 
superficial, circling around the surface area. Sharia movement 
tends to be non long-term oriented in solving socio-economic 
problems of communities. It is still short-term results oriented 
with short time and measurable targets. In spite of various 
limitations, sharia discourse is at least capable of functioning as 
a collective morality bond, especially in the Muslim-majority 
regions. Under conditions of crisis, people need a value system 
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to hold on together. Crisis often lead to anomie in which the 
old system is no longer valid or delegitimized, whereas a new 
system for substitution has not been provided.  
Rapid growth of sharia regulations occurs during the 
period of this anomie. It is in this context that the initiation of 
sharia becomes praiseworthy as it prevents greater risk of chaos 
due to the absence of moral value base to hold on together. 
This argument is strengthened by fact that the "golden" period 
of sharia s in these areas only lasted for 3-5 years before they 
lost charm and influence on society.  
Sharia movements at the local level have also become 
a momentum of social as well as democratic consolidations. 
The discourse of sharia has attracted Islamic ideological groups 
to enter into the epicenter of the local democracy dynamic. 
These groups were previously excluded from political activism, 
and they comprise such groups as ex. Masjumi, Darul Islam, 
and other sharia ideology bearers. For four decades (1950-
1990's) they experienced repressive military regimes and 
stigmatization.  
During this period they were forced to be apolitical 
whereas in fact, establishment of substantive democracy 
requires active participations from all elements of society. In the 
context,  sharia discourse becomes so magnetic and provides 
space for political participation of ideological Islamic groups. 
This development is of course very meaningful to the 
improvement of the quality of democracy in Indonesia.91 
It is interesting to see that the consolidation and 
political participation of the ideological Islamic groups do not 
only occur within the golden period of sharia movement. For 
the case of Bulukumba district, for example, the golden period 
																																								 																				
91 Hakimul Ikhwan, “Gerakan Syariah dan Demokrasi,” in Kompas, 
26December 2011. 
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of sharia movement occurred in 2001-2006 under the Regent 
Patabai Pabokori. In that period, sharia movement was able to 
mobilize human and financial resources in large numbers. Sharia 
discourse colored government bureaucracy, education in 
general, teaching in schools, and even wedding celebration 
events in the society. After 2006, when the local power 
switched, sharia trend started fading. Financial support was 
thinning, and mobilization of kiai and ustadz was also coming to 
an end. 
However, such situation did not suddenly depoliticize 
ideological Islamic groups. Consolidation of movement is 
maintained. Substantive participation in the policy making 
process remains consistently performed. If prior to the 
declaration of sharia movement they tended to withdraw from 
political activism, in present situation they are actively trying to 
influence the policy process. They did not enter the political 
power structure, but they have an effective medium for 
expressing political aspirations in the sense of local democracy.  
Furthermore, the ideological Islamic groups, who 
formerly often performed street actions for their amar ma’ruf 
nahi munkar mission, are now beginning to adopt a more elegant 
method. Their moral movement is no longer violent, but 
peaceful and measurable. Physical violence is no longer the 
case, especially in dealing with immoral practices such as 
gambling and prostitution. 
This condition is influenced by at least two features. 
First, internalization of Islamic values of peace and mercy upon 
all has settled. Second, democratic mechanism is believed to 
open up space for the possibility to realize the ideals of the 
struggle. Thus, sharia movement in many areas has contributed 
to build and strengthen democracy. Relationships do not 
happen in fights and negating each other. Instead, it should be 
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understood within the frame of complement upon each other 
in building a democratic system.   
Review of the two case studies (PKS & HTI) above 
generally indicates four fairly steady shifts in Islamist ideology 
and activism which tend to be more manifested as a step of 
transition from a non-democratic context into a democratic 
context in Indonesia, including in South Sulawesi:  
1. From the idea of an Islamic state establishment and sharia 
enforcement to Islamic values / sharia: In certain cases, the 
normalization of democratic perspective especially that of PKS 
showed a shift of the struggle of sharia (Islamist activism 
prerequisite) which requires new institutions (as a system or an 
Islamic state), to focus on sharia as a set of values or principles 
intended to be enacted through the existing political process. 
They are more likely to achieve these goals through political 
participation rather than revolution, this is a logical conclusion 
of a tactical decision; however, it can also have wide-ranging 
consequences as it could potentially change the ideological 
relationship and practical of Islamism with its historical 
purpose, the Islamic state. Specifically viewed from the stand 
point of the Islamists, Islamic State becomes a less important 
factor in the Islamization of society. Similarly, although HT 
struggles to establish the Khilafah, in practical terms they are 
more likely to be soft in articulating their interests. 
2. From Islamic Government to 'Good Governance': the term 
good governance has become the jargon of the two movements 
(PKS and HTI). The two case studies reflect gradual 
secularization of the policy agenda of the Islamists. This is not 
to assert that the Islamists abandon their religious agenda or 
adopt policies which are incompatible with their Islamic 
principles, as for them, clinging to the interpretation of Islam 
remains important. In these contexts, Islamists also become 
involved in, and are forced to respond to, a broad range of 
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issues in which 'Islam' says very little. Sometimes it is hard to 
show supporters what is Islamic regarding the way out offered 
by these movements. For example, this is reflected in their 
approaches to economic policy wherein there is a shift from the 
historically Islamism focus on social equality to a more neo-
liberal approach. This shift serves as a substantive purpose in 
relation to Islamist efforts, not only to find a rational policy 
response to the real problems, but also to serve as a political 
goal in order to attract new followers.  
3 . Greater diversity of members: the shift in the ideas and 
activism of the Islamist movements facilitates and reflects 
changes in the membership of the movement and the party. As 
socio-religious movements, Islamists groups typically restrict 
their membership to people who fit certain criteria - usually it 
requires a Muslim, or even a 'particular Muslim', embracing 
certain type of interpretation of Islam and has a certain role in 
public life. As a political party in a democratic context, the most 
important point is to expand the scope of membership, more 
specifically to attract talented people from all political circles. 
This trend then taken by many observers to judge that the 
Islamic movements, particularly PKS, are very pragmatic in 
certain conditions.  Similarly, although HT is not as open as 
PKS, for the sake of development and to realize the vision and 
mission of the organization HT also must act "pragmatic" 
under certain conditions. For example, lack of firmness for 
prospective members to fit in their organization. Another 
example is lack of determination for members to participate or 
not participate in the elections. 
4 . Oscillation rather than moderation: Seen from the surface, a 
review of the two cases above shows that PKS and HTI agreed 
to support the idea that greater democracy tends to smooth 
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With a strong Islamic identity, it comes naturally reasonable 
when Islamic symbols were highly correlated with their political 
identity. Political expression of Islam and political Islam in 
South Sulawesi has its own identity. The feature of Islamism 
operating on intra-and extra-parliamentary areas in South 
Sulawsei provide its own color in the constellation of local 
politics, both directly and indirectly.  PKS and some other 
Islamic parties such as the PPP and UN, which prefer entering 
the structural power, also provide their own color in the 
activism of fighting for the values of Islam. On the other hand, 
KPPSI and some other extra-parliamentary forces of Islamic 
movement in the region also accommodate with its own color 
in the activism of fighting for Islamic law. This is different from 
the case of Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia, which is likely to be 
consistent with its concept of Khilafah that it appears contra to 
the model of democracy existing currently.  
 At least the movement pattern of Islamism in South 
Sulawesi tends to the direction of post-Islamism, which is a 
more modern movement. It means that most of the existing 
movements tend to be more accommodating to the ruler or 
government, except for HTI, which is more consistent their 
political base and vision compared to other ideological 
movements in South Sulawesi. Even so, HTI still occupies an 
area of criticism as it is regarded to be enjoying the existing 
democracy system. The logic is that HTI would never survive 
																																								 																				
92 Some parts of this conclusion agree with that of Greg Fealy 
dan Anthony Bubalo. See Anthony Bubalo, Greg Fealy & Whit Mason. 
2012. Zealous Democrats: Islamism and Democracy in Egypt, Indonesia and Turkey. 
Translated by Syamsu Rijal, PKS dan Kembarannya; Bergiat jadi demokrat di 
Indonesia, Mesir dan Turki. Jakarta, Komunitas Bambu. p..5 
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with its current existence if they did not “negotiate” with the 
state. This tendency of sifting feature from Islamism to post-
Islamism is more or less influenced by three sources of 
influence and main challenges, namely the political system 
existing in Indonesia, the emergence of critical secular groups, 
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